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You searched for +publisher:"The Ohio State University" +contributor:("Pappas, George"). Showing records 1 – 3 of 3 total matches.

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The Ohio State University

1. Nichols, Ryan Tate. Reid's Philosophy of Mind.

Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2002, The Ohio State University

Employing the faculty of perception marks the only possible means by which we can gather knowledge of our environment. Despite this, in roughly the century and a half leading up to Reid’s Intellectual Powers, philosophers had widely turned from viewing this wondrous faculty as our companion in the quest for knowledge. Descartes, along with Galileo and Gassendi, begins a trend which, as Reid sees it, culminates in Hume. These thinkers, in increasing degrees, began to harbor a suspicion that our senses cannot be trusted with any epistemologically important responsibilities. This attitude was grounded upon a belief that the immediate objects of perceptual states are not external objects, but rather ideas and impressions. Reid argues that this doctrine, which he calls the ‘Way of Ideas’ and the ‘Ideal Theory’ was as philosophically feeble as it was popular. In the earliest parts of his philosophical career Reid found himself party to a broadly Berkeleyan view of mind and world, but appreciating the implications of Hume’s theories revealed to Reid the error of his ways. From that point onward, Reid takes it upon himself to rehabilitate the study of perception in order to show that, contrary to the Way of Ideas, we—that is, both philosophers and non-philosophers—have knowledge of our environments. This includes not only knowledge that there is an external world, but specific knowledge of some of its contents. While the origins of Reid’s interest in the study of perception are perhaps more complicated than they seem, the importance of his work is quite clear, particularly in the face of revivals of the Way of Ideas in contemporary work on both cognition and perception. The purpose of this work is to systematically present Reid’s theory of the mind and its relation to the world. I intend to make clear Reid’s differences with his predecessors about the nature of thought, the structure of the process of perception and about perceptual learning. Advisors/Committee Members: Pappas, George (Advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Philosophy; REID; Sensation; Hume; Ideal Theory; perception; perceptual; visible figure

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Nichols, R. T. (2002). Reid's Philosophy of Mind. (Doctoral Dissertation). The Ohio State University. Retrieved from http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1039111436

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Nichols, Ryan Tate. “Reid's Philosophy of Mind.” 2002. Doctoral Dissertation, The Ohio State University. Accessed September 25, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1039111436.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Nichols, Ryan Tate. “Reid's Philosophy of Mind.” 2002. Web. 25 Sep 2020.

Vancouver:

Nichols RT. Reid's Philosophy of Mind. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. The Ohio State University; 2002. [cited 2020 Sep 25]. Available from: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1039111436.

Council of Science Editors:

Nichols RT. Reid's Philosophy of Mind. [Doctoral Dissertation]. The Ohio State University; 2002. Available from: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1039111436


The Ohio State University

2. Smith, Joshua A. A relevant alternatives analysis of knowledge.

Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2006, The Ohio State University

This project shows that a relevant alternatives account of knowledge is correct. Such accounts maintain that knowing that something is the case requires eliminating all of the relevant alternatives to what is believed. Despite generating a great deal of interest after Dretske and Goldman introduced them, relevant alternatives accounts have been abandoned by many due to the inability of those who defend such analyses to provide general accounts of what it is for an alternative to be relevant, and what it is for an alternative to be eliminated. To make sense of the notion of relevance, a number of relevant alternatives theorists have adopted contextualism, the view that the truth conditions for knowledge attributions shift from one conversational context to the next. The thought that the only way to make sense of relevance is to adopt a controversial thesis about how knowledge attributions work has led others to despair over the prospects for such accounts. I rescue the relevant alternatives approach to knowledge by providing the missing details, and doing so in purely evidentialist terms, thereby avoiding a commitment to contextualism. The account of relevance I develop articulates what it is for a state of affairs (possible world) to be relevant in terms of whether the person is in a good epistemic position in that state of affairs with respect to what the person actually believes. Eliminating a possibility, on my account, is a matter of one's evidence being incompatible with a relevant state of affairs. Since each of these notions is explicated in evidentialist terms (that is, in terms of the evidence one has), I also provide an account of having evidence which is superior to extant accounts. To show that the resulting account of knowledge is correct, I show how the account fares well in the face of problems which plague its competitors. The upshot of the project is that a relevant alternatives analysis is correct, and that endorsing such an account no longer involves concerning oneself with its occult status. Advisors/Committee Members: Pappas, George (Advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Philosophy; epistemology; relevant alternatives

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Smith, J. A. (2006). A relevant alternatives analysis of knowledge. (Doctoral Dissertation). The Ohio State University. Retrieved from http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1148869371

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Smith, Joshua A. “A relevant alternatives analysis of knowledge.” 2006. Doctoral Dissertation, The Ohio State University. Accessed September 25, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1148869371.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Smith, Joshua A. “A relevant alternatives analysis of knowledge.” 2006. Web. 25 Sep 2020.

Vancouver:

Smith JA. A relevant alternatives analysis of knowledge. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. The Ohio State University; 2006. [cited 2020 Sep 25]. Available from: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1148869371.

Council of Science Editors:

Smith JA. A relevant alternatives analysis of knowledge. [Doctoral Dissertation]. The Ohio State University; 2006. Available from: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1148869371


The Ohio State University

3. Roche, William. The structure and grounding of epistemic justification.

Degree: PhD, Philosophy, 2006, The Ohio State University

I articulate and defend a new version of the coherence theory of epistemic justification. It is new, in part, because, unlike traditional varieties of coherentism, it is externalist—viz., it implies that justification supervenes, in part, on things that are neither mental nor supervenient on the mental. The theory, overall, has three distinguishing components. First, there is an explanationist component, which says that an inductive inferential relation is cogent only if it is explanatorily virtuous. In this respect, my account is in the spirit of both William Lycan’s brand of coherentism, and the brand oft attributed to Gilbert Harman and Wilfrid Sellars. Second, there is a meta-perspectivalist component, saying (for starters) that S has good reason for thinking that p obtains only if from S’s perspective it is likely that he is connected to p. This, when fully spelled out, has the result that S’s belief system is coherent only if S has a view as to how he is connected to the outside world, and according to which the mechanisms involved (e.g., vision) are reliable. And third, there is a veridicality component, which requires that S’s reasons be true, and that S’s reasons for his reasons be true, and so on. This, together with the meta-perspectivalist component, requires that S be correct as to how he is reliably connected to the outside world. This is what makes my position externalist. I develop and argue positively for each of these three distinguishing components, thereby refuting my theory’s chief rivals in the coherentist camp. I also argue against the three standard objections to coherentism: the Alternative-Systems Objection, the Isolation Objection, and the Experience Objection. Take the Experience Objection, for instance. It charges that foundationalist theories are superior to coherentist theories because, unlike coherentist theories, they allow a role for experiences (e.g., visual experiences) in justification. I argue that, initial appearances notwithstanding, experiences are unfit to serve as reasons, either for or against beliefs. The ultimate payoff is philosophical understanding of the structure and grounding of justification—an understanding, that is, that justification is coherentist in structure and externalist in grounding. Advisors/Committee Members: Pappas, George (Advisor).

Subjects/Keywords: Philosophy; epistemic justification; good reason; coherentism; foundationalism; coherence; inference to the best explanation; experience; acquaintance

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Roche, W. (2006). The structure and grounding of epistemic justification. (Doctoral Dissertation). The Ohio State University. Retrieved from http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1141674153

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Roche, William. “The structure and grounding of epistemic justification.” 2006. Doctoral Dissertation, The Ohio State University. Accessed September 25, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1141674153.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Roche, William. “The structure and grounding of epistemic justification.” 2006. Web. 25 Sep 2020.

Vancouver:

Roche W. The structure and grounding of epistemic justification. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. The Ohio State University; 2006. [cited 2020 Sep 25]. Available from: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1141674153.

Council of Science Editors:

Roche W. The structure and grounding of epistemic justification. [Doctoral Dissertation]. The Ohio State University; 2006. Available from: http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1141674153

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