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Texas A&M University
1.
An, Seung-Ho.
Optimal Turnover Rates and Organizational Performance in Public and Nonprofit Organizations.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2018, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/173928 
► Until recent years, most public and nonprofit management studies have focused on the determinants of turnover rather than the consequences. In this line of literature,…
(more)
▼ Until recent years, most public and nonprofit management studies have focused on the
determinants of turnover rather than the consequences. In this line of literature, a better
theory of turnover for public and nonprofit organizations, especially the one focused on
outcomes of turnover, is needed. This dissertation seeks to advance our knowledge on the
issues of turnover and organizational performance in public and nonprofit management.
Using the three-paper model, the dissertation not only develops a theoretical model on
turnover and performance, but also conduct empirical testing on how turnover affects the
performance of public and nonprofit organizations.
Specifically, the first essay presents an economic model based on turnover
cost-benefit theories by incorporating labor market conditions and quality of employees,
which can be applied regardless of sector and industry. To do so, I re-evaluate turnover
and retention costs that change according to employee quality and labor supply and
demand. I also propose several testable hypotheses for future scholars, which enable them
to examine under what conditions the optimal rates of turnover change and how public
managers would benefit from an occurrence of turnover. The second essay investigates
the effects of employee turnover on organizational performance in Florida school
districts, distinguishing types of turnover as voluntary and involuntary. In the essay, I find
an inverted-U shaped relationship between involuntary turnover and organizational
performance, first positive and then negative. The last essay tests an inverted-U shaped
relationship in the context of the United Way nonprofit organizations. Findings suggest
that governing board turnover rates have a nonlinear effect on nonprofit financial
capacity, first positive and then negative. Taken together, both theoretical and empirical
investigations in this dissertation suggest that optimal turnover rates exist and that those
can vary by sector. The findings provide an important lesson for both scholars and
practitioners that turnover should be appropriately managed, not necessarily minimized.
Advisors/Committee Members: Meier, Kenneth J. (advisor), Whitten, Guy D. (committee member), Teodoro, Manuel P. (committee member), Paarlberg, Laurie E. (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Organizational Turnover; Organizational Performance
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
An, S. (2018). Optimal Turnover Rates and Organizational Performance in Public and Nonprofit Organizations. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/173928
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
An, Seung-Ho. “Optimal Turnover Rates and Organizational Performance in Public and Nonprofit Organizations.” 2018. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/173928.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
An, Seung-Ho. “Optimal Turnover Rates and Organizational Performance in Public and Nonprofit Organizations.” 2018. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
An S. Optimal Turnover Rates and Organizational Performance in Public and Nonprofit Organizations. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2018. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/173928.
Council of Science Editors:
An S. Optimal Turnover Rates and Organizational Performance in Public and Nonprofit Organizations. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2018. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/173928
Texas A&M University
2.
Favero, Nathan Bradley.
Representation in the Fourth Branch of Government: A Closer Look at the Link between Employee Demographics and Client Outcomes.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2016, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/157168
► Bureaucrats play a major part in implementing government programs and—ultimately—take on a policy making role in many contexts given the broad discretion bureaucrats often have…
(more)
▼ Bureaucrats play a major part in implementing government programs and—ultimately—take on a policy making role in many contexts given the broad discretion bureaucrats often have as they go about their work. Representative bureaucracy theory suggests that unelected bureaucrats can serve as representatives of members of the public as they go about making policy by virtue of having shared demographic characteristics with some members of the public. Focusing mainly on the demographic characteristic of race, I consider various ways in which the demographic makeup of a bureaucracy might influence the extent to which that bureaucracy advances the interests of various segments of the public.
After providing a theoretical framework, I conduct a series of empirical tests using large datasets of public organizations. Consistent with prior work, I generally find that clients of a particular race experience better outcomes when they are served by a bureaucracy that has more personnel who share their race. I also uncover several more novel findings. First, I measure two sets of bureaucratic values (representative role acceptance and general political ideology) and find that for the most part, differences in these values do not explain why bureaucracies with different racial compositions function differently. Second, I examine an example where the racial composition of a bureaucracy does not generally appear to affect bureaucratic outcomes and then find that effects do appear when bureaucratic clients have widely diverging service demands. Third, I find some evidence that differences in outcomes associated with bureaucratic racial composition are not fully explained by individual-level differences in bureaucratic behavior or client responses that fall along racial lines; instead, the racial composition of a bureaucracy appears to be related to bigger, organizational-level attributes of a bureaucracy. Fourth, minority bureaucrats appear to mostly benefit bureaucratic clients of their own race, with benefits not generally extending to clients belonging to other minority racial group. Taken as a whole, these results suggest the need for representative bureaucracy theory scholars to more carefully examine organizational context, bureaucratic values, and the tradeoffs inherent in bureaucratic decision-making.
Advisors/Committee Members: Meier, Kenneth J (advisor), Taylor, Lori L (committee member), Teodoro, Manuel P (committee member), Whitten, Guy D (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Bureaucracy; Public Administration; Race; Representation; Education
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APA (6th Edition):
Favero, N. B. (2016). Representation in the Fourth Branch of Government: A Closer Look at the Link between Employee Demographics and Client Outcomes. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/157168
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Favero, Nathan Bradley. “Representation in the Fourth Branch of Government: A Closer Look at the Link between Employee Demographics and Client Outcomes.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/157168.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Favero, Nathan Bradley. “Representation in the Fourth Branch of Government: A Closer Look at the Link between Employee Demographics and Client Outcomes.” 2016. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Favero NB. Representation in the Fourth Branch of Government: A Closer Look at the Link between Employee Demographics and Client Outcomes. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2016. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/157168.
Council of Science Editors:
Favero NB. Representation in the Fourth Branch of Government: A Closer Look at the Link between Employee Demographics and Client Outcomes. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/157168
Texas A&M University
3.
Cheon, Ohbet.
Management and Performance in U.S. Healthcare Institutions: Do Sector-Differences Matter?.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2016, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/157770
► This dissertation includes three essays that focus on a number of central themes in public management and performance. Using American hospitals and nursing homes, I…
(more)
▼ This dissertation includes three essays that focus on a number of central themes in public management and performance. Using American hospitals and nursing homes, I explore how sector-differences matter in healthcare service delivery. I propose theoretical frameworks on how managers respond to performance information in the cyclical process and how they employ the information in their managerial decisions.
The three essays explore how public, nonprofit, and for-profit organizations perform differently in various performance dimensions, and how sector-differences leverage the ways of utilizing performance information on managerial decisions, networking and strategy. The first essay, Do Public Hospitals Outperform Nonprofit and For-profit Hospitals?, indicates that sector-differences matter in organizational performance where a trade-off relationship exists. The second essay, Help! I Need Somebody, provides evidence that managers strategically choose networking nodes in response to performance information. The third essay, Looking for Strategy in All the Wrong Places, reveals that performance information shapes managerial strategy, either prospecting or defending, but the impact is contingent on sectors. The findings contribute to public management literature that even if organizations have similar functions, tasks, rules and clients, sector-differences influence managerial decisions related to outcomes.
Advisors/Committee Members: Meier, Kenneth J (advisor), Teodoro, Manuel P (committee member), Whitten, Guy D (committee member), Paarlberg, Laurie E (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Management; Performance; Ownership; Networking; Strategy; Healthcare Organizations
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Cheon, O. (2016). Management and Performance in U.S. Healthcare Institutions: Do Sector-Differences Matter?. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/157770
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Cheon, Ohbet. “Management and Performance in U.S. Healthcare Institutions: Do Sector-Differences Matter?.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/157770.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Cheon, Ohbet. “Management and Performance in U.S. Healthcare Institutions: Do Sector-Differences Matter?.” 2016. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Cheon O. Management and Performance in U.S. Healthcare Institutions: Do Sector-Differences Matter?. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2016. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/157770.
Council of Science Editors:
Cheon O. Management and Performance in U.S. Healthcare Institutions: Do Sector-Differences Matter?. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/157770
4.
Compton, Mallory Elise.
The Political Economy of Unemployment Insurance.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2016, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/158029
► In this dissertation, I examine questions of strategic political control through institutional design, government responsiveness to economic insecurity in social context, and opportunistic political control…
(more)
▼ In this dissertation, I examine questions of strategic political control through institutional design, government responsiveness to economic insecurity in social context, and opportunistic political control of bureaucratic performance in social insurance programs. I theorize how political divergence and economic forces influence institutional design, and how social and economic factors constrain social insurance generosity. I first offer a formal model of institutional choice— how and why policymakers choose to decentralize social insurance programs. I argue that ideological divergence leads to greater decentralization, and that institutional feedback through the establishment of vested interests encourages greater centralization. A study of the 1935 U.S. Social Security Act illustrates and supports this argument. In the second component of this project, I distinguish between civic and charitable forms of social capital, and I offer a theory of their respective effects on social policy responsiveness to macroeconomic dynamics. With novel data, I find support for my explanation, which challenges the fundamental arguments that Putnam and others have made. Lastly, I reexamine the political economy literature on political budget cycles by more closely considering the administrative mechanisms through which elected officials manipulate the provision of public goods and services. I extend research that points to an electoral cycle in government spending on social transfer programs by incorporating theory from the study of administrative political control. Politicians will be more successful in exerting pressure on bureaucrats to perform better, to be more generous, and timelier in processing unemployment insurance payments in the context of greater electoral competition and macroeconomic insecurity. By approaching unemployment policy institutions from these multiple perspectives, I further an understanding of the social, political, and economic influences on policies designed to alleviate economic insecurity.
Advisors/Committee Members: Meier, Kenneth J. (advisor), Lipsmeyer, Christine S. (advisor), Whitten, Guy D. (committee member), Bowman, Ann O'M. (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: public policy; political economy; social insurance; unemployment insurance; bureaucracy
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Compton, M. E. (2016). The Political Economy of Unemployment Insurance. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/158029
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Compton, Mallory Elise. “The Political Economy of Unemployment Insurance.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/158029.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Compton, Mallory Elise. “The Political Economy of Unemployment Insurance.” 2016. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Compton ME. The Political Economy of Unemployment Insurance. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2016. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/158029.
Council of Science Editors:
Compton ME. The Political Economy of Unemployment Insurance. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/158029
Texas A&M University
5.
Philips, Andrew Q.
Manipulating the Masses: New Theories of Political Cycles.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2017, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/161357
► Despite a large literature on political cycles, many theories and empirical results conflict with one another. I address this disconnect through three interrelated contributions. I…
(more)
▼ Despite a large literature on political cycles, many theories and empirical results conflict with one another. I address this disconnect through three interrelated contributions. I first conduct an extensive quantitative survey of the political budget cycle literature through a meta-analysis. I find that overall there exists a positive, though substantively small political budget cycle effect. Second, I examine how incumbents may use alternatives to fiscal manipulation, such as the passage of redistributive policies, since these send a key signal to voters. Third, I examine how incumbents may not only time fiscal manipulation, but control their placement spatially. This ties in the political budget cycle literature with the literature on distributive politics. Although these findings call into question some of the existing views of political budget cycles, they show that cycles manifest themselves in alternative fashions.
Advisors/Committee Members: Whitten, Guy D (advisor), Lipsmeyer, Christine S (committee member), Escobar-Lemmon, Maria (committee member), Goidel, Kirby (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Political cycles; political budget cycles; political business cycles; distributive politics
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Philips, A. Q. (2017). Manipulating the Masses: New Theories of Political Cycles. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/161357
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Philips, Andrew Q. “Manipulating the Masses: New Theories of Political Cycles.” 2017. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/161357.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Philips, Andrew Q. “Manipulating the Masses: New Theories of Political Cycles.” 2017. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Philips AQ. Manipulating the Masses: New Theories of Political Cycles. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2017. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/161357.
Council of Science Editors:
Philips AQ. Manipulating the Masses: New Theories of Political Cycles. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2017. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/161357
Texas A&M University
6.
Flink, Carla Michelle.
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Methodological and Theoretical Extensions.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2014, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/152666
► The purpose of this dissertation is to add to the understanding of budgetary processes and changes in public organizations. Work in this field has relied…
(more)
▼ The purpose of this dissertation is to add to the understanding of budgetary processes and changes in public organizations. Work in this field has relied upon the theory of incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium theory as explanations of the budgetary process. In short, these theories state that budgetary changes will be mostly small (incremental), but also subject to overly large changes (punctuations).
Categorizations and conceptualizations of incremental and punctuated changes have varied much through the literature. This has led to much confusion over what is and is not incrementalism in budgetary studies. After a review of all the ways in which budgetary changes are characterized and measured throughout scholarly work, this dissertation contributes to the literature by describing four unique types of incrementalism that scholars have utilized in their work. It is the hope that scholars
can adopt these terminologies to better communicate how they are conceptualizing
incrementalism.
Leading explanations for incremental and punctuated patterns of change revolve around cognitive limitations and institutional friction-the organizational structure of decision-making. To advance the literature, this dissertation draws from public administration literature and theorizes about "non-institutional friction" that influences budgetary changes. Non-institutional frictions are factors aside from institutional structure than can affect budgetary decision-making. Furthermore, this
dissertation extends punctuated equilibrium work to examine the consequences of
punctuations and incremental changes on public organization performance.
Using data from hundreds of public organizations (
Texas school districts) for over a fifteen year period, this dissertation finds support for non-institutional friction. In addition, results indicate that managers are able to keep relatively stable performance despite rapid (positive and negative) budgetary changes.
Advisors/Committee Members: Meier, Kenneth J. (advisor), Hill, Kim Q. (committee member), Whitten, Guy D. (committee member), Robinson, Scott E. (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Budgetary process; incrementalism; punctuated equilibrium theory
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Flink, C. M. (2014). Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Methodological and Theoretical Extensions. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/152666
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Flink, Carla Michelle. “Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Methodological and Theoretical Extensions.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/152666.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Flink, Carla Michelle. “Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Methodological and Theoretical Extensions.” 2014. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Flink CM. Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Methodological and Theoretical Extensions. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2014. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/152666.
Council of Science Editors:
Flink CM. Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Methodological and Theoretical Extensions. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/152666
Texas A&M University
7.
Seki, Katsunori.
Causes and Consequences of Elections in Nondemocracies.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2015, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/154959
► In this dissertation, I offer an answer to one of the most important questions about authoritarian politics today: why do dictatorships hold elections? In order…
(more)
▼ In this dissertation, I offer an answer to one of the most important questions about authoritarian politics today: why do dictatorships hold elections? In order to answer this broad question, I study the causes and consequences of elections as well as the role of elections in nondemocratic settings. First, I develop a theory about the causes of elections in dictatorships, which is based on the different threats that dictatorships face and the different goals that they have in order to lessen or avoid these threats. I argue that dictatorships opt for elections for the effective executive if they need to avoid violent removal. In contrast, dictatorships begin elections for a national legislature if they seek to maintain the unity and cohesion of elites in the ruling circle and/or to coopt elites from outside of the regime. Second, I present a theory about the consequences of elections in dictatorships. I contend that two seemingly competing effects of elections are mutually complementary. Individual elections can create a momentum for regime change, leading to the collapse of dictatorships and democratic transitions. At the same time, once dictatorships survive elections, election results convey useful information for the purpose of cooptation and send a signal that deters future challenges to the regime. Tests of my theory on a sample of dictatorships after World War II show robust support for my theory about the causes and consequences of elections. Finally, I revisit the information collection role of elections in nondemocratic settings. I theorize that elections can be either informative or less informative depending on the strategic decisions that major opposition parties make. I develop a formal theory to describe this causal mechanism. An important implication of my theory is that informative elections are associated with post-electoral redistribution of goods and patronage while less informative elections in which major opposition parties boycott elections are not. I test this implication by using original data collected from Serbia in 1990s and present results that are consistent with my theory.
Advisors/Committee Members: Whitten, Guy D. (advisor), Escobar-Lemmon, Maria C. (committee member), Whang, Taehee (committee member), Bearfield, Domonic (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Dictatorships; Elections; Democratic Transitions
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Seki, K. (2015). Causes and Consequences of Elections in Nondemocracies. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/154959
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Seki, Katsunori. “Causes and Consequences of Elections in Nondemocracies.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/154959.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Seki, Katsunori. “Causes and Consequences of Elections in Nondemocracies.” 2015. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Seki K. Causes and Consequences of Elections in Nondemocracies. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2015. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/154959.
Council of Science Editors:
Seki K. Causes and Consequences of Elections in Nondemocracies. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/154959
Texas A&M University
8.
Rutherford, Amanda N.
Politics, Perceptions, and Performance in Higher Education.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2015, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/155059
► This dissertation includes three studies devoted to disentangling the effects of managers—defined as university presidents—in four year institutions of higher education. In the United States,…
(more)
▼ This dissertation includes three studies devoted to disentangling the effects of managers—defined as
university presidents—in four year institutions of higher education. In the United States, higher education as a whole is experiencing much uncertainty in a consistently changing external environment. State allocations have dropped substantially, forcing many colleges and universities to become more dependent on private funding and student tuition. At the same time, stakeholder groups have called for higher levels of accountability throughout the higher education sector in hopes of improving national standards of access, quality, and affordability. This funding instability and the political saliency of education have forced the leaders of these institutions to become part-politicians while determining how to strategically maintain a share of a competitive market. Drawing from political science and public administration theories, I examine whether and how presidents develop strategy and whether differences in managerial backgrounds have any effect on how institutions are managed using multivariate analysis on cross sectional time series data from research universities in the United States.
The research in this dissertation builds upon organizational-environmental fit literature to determine whether the fit between presidents’ former and current institutions has any effect on student retention, graduation, or degree completion. Findings imply that some fit is good but too much fit has negative consequences for performance. Additional analyses focuses on determining whether presidents implement strategic change or simply manage incremental shifts in institutional revenues, expenditures, and pricing given the current demands of the external environment. Interestingly, little strategy is detecting, suggesting that decision making aggregated at the institutional-level is perhaps random. Finally, this research explores the nonlinear determinants and effects of administrative intensity, a non-monetary phenomena often determined by presidents. Some types of administrative intensity can be helpful for boosting student performance but, this type of staffing can also have a negative effect on performance if it exceeds at given threshold.
Advisors/Committee Members: Meier, Kenneth J (advisor), Bowman, Ann O'M. (committee member), Teodoro, Manuel P. (committee member), Whitten, Guy D. (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: managerial fit; education policy; performance management
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Rutherford, A. N. (2015). Politics, Perceptions, and Performance in Higher Education. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/155059
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Rutherford, Amanda N. “Politics, Perceptions, and Performance in Higher Education.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/155059.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Rutherford, Amanda N. “Politics, Perceptions, and Performance in Higher Education.” 2015. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Rutherford AN. Politics, Perceptions, and Performance in Higher Education. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2015. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/155059.
Council of Science Editors:
Rutherford AN. Politics, Perceptions, and Performance in Higher Education. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2015. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/155059
Texas A&M University
9.
Lee, Han Soo.
Three Way Inforamtion Flow Between the President, News Media, and the Public.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2011, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2009-12-7358
► Regarding presidential responsiveness and leadership, this study addresses two questions: Does the president respond to the public? Does the president lead the public? Unlike prior…
(more)
▼ Regarding presidential responsiveness and leadership, this study addresses two questions: Does the president respond to the public? Does the president lead the public? Unlike prior research, this study tries to answer these questions by focusing on the news media intervening in the relationship between the president and the public. Rather than positing a direct relationship between them, this study points out that information flows between the president and the public through the news media, which affect the president and the public. The public receives daily political information including presidential messages from the news media. Also, presidents recognize public sentiments from news stories. Accordingly, this study examines the potentially multidirectional relationships between the three actors from 1958 to 2004 in the United States. This study estimates the reciprocal relationships between the three actors by using Vector Autoregression (VAR) and Moving Average Response (MAR) simulations. Analyzing the three actors' issue stances, this study reveals that the news media significantly influence the public and the president. However, the direct relationship between the president and the public is negligible. Furthermore, the empirical findings demonstrate that presidential responsiveness is more likely to be observed when the news media report news stories consonant with past public opinion changes.
Advisors/Committee Members: Wood, B. D. (advisor), Peterson, David A. (committee member), Whitten, Guy D. (committee member), Prechel, Harland (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: media; public opinion; president, persuasion; political communication; presidential responsiveness; presidential leadership
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Lee, H. S. (2011). Three Way Inforamtion Flow Between the President, News Media, and the Public. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2009-12-7358
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Lee, Han Soo. “Three Way Inforamtion Flow Between the President, News Media, and the Public.” 2011. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2009-12-7358.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Lee, Han Soo. “Three Way Inforamtion Flow Between the President, News Media, and the Public.” 2011. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Lee HS. Three Way Inforamtion Flow Between the President, News Media, and the Public. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2011. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2009-12-7358.
Council of Science Editors:
Lee HS. Three Way Inforamtion Flow Between the President, News Media, and the Public. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2011. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2009-12-7358
10.
Wimpy, Cameron.
Foiled Expectations: When Democracy Doesn't Deliver.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2014, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/153867
► In this dissertation I propose and test a refined theory for the calculus of voting. I accomplish this by building on the classic model that…
(more)
▼ In this dissertation I propose and test a refined theory for the calculus of voting. I accomplish this by building on the classic model that includes the “duty” or “D” term as the primary motivating factor behind voting. I theorize that voters have basic expectations for democracy and how it should work for them in their own local context. I posit that voting then becomes an expressive act by voters as they decide to commit to the regime or not based on how they perceive their met or unmet expectations. My primary empirical focus is on developing democracies. Within that context I focus on the expectation that voters have for property rights. As such I place property rights in the broader theoretical context of voters’ expectations for democracies.
At a basic level this dissertation adds to well-established literatures on micro political economy and voter turnout. On a theoretical and empirical level I incorporate several literatures by drawing on formal models of turnout and employing data from the newest developing democracies. I test my theory and find support for my proposition that property rights can motivate voter turnout. I then move into a discussion of implications for democracies that fail to meet voters’ expectations. In the face of unfulfilled expectations (often manifested through a lack of property rights protection) declining voter turnout may be just the tip of a looming iceberg. These democracies can expect to see several potential phenomena including reduced support for democracy and the regime as well as potential increases in (often violent) social conflict. Ultimately these regimes could experience severe democratic backsliding and potential full collapse.
Advisors/Committee Members: Whitten, Guy D. (advisor), Meier, Kenneth J. (committee member), Kellam, Marisa A. (committee member), Hartkopf Schloss, Rebecca (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: property rights; voting
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APA (6th Edition):
Wimpy, C. (2014). Foiled Expectations: When Democracy Doesn't Deliver. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/153867
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Wimpy, Cameron. “Foiled Expectations: When Democracy Doesn't Deliver.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/153867.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Wimpy, Cameron. “Foiled Expectations: When Democracy Doesn't Deliver.” 2014. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Wimpy C. Foiled Expectations: When Democracy Doesn't Deliver. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2014. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/153867.
Council of Science Editors:
Wimpy C. Foiled Expectations: When Democracy Doesn't Deliver. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2014. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/153867
11.
Hicks, Brian N.
Domestic Institutions and the Supply and Demand of Remittances.
Degree: MA, Political Science, 2011, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2009-12-7514
► Many countries are dependent upon capital flows for their balance of payments accounts. Sources of expenditures include foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment (PI) and…
(more)
▼ Many countries are dependent upon capital flows for their balance of payments accounts. Sources of expenditures include foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment (PI) and remittances. While the determinants of FDI and PI have been extensively analyzed, the analyses of remittance flows from host to home countries are largely lacking and wide-ranging. Factors predominantly not considered are domestic institutions which support or encourage international remittance exchange. Nations routinely desire to control international immigration and capital movement. Consequently they adopt domestic policies which create and enforce institutions that manage both capital and labor mobility across borders. Additionally, researchers commonly neglect to consider the impact of both the supply and demand factors simultaneously, or in other words, the domestic condition (home and host) which both push and pull migrants to migrate and remit. Further, given the non-dyadic nature of the data, there arises a need to "regionalize" the data. To test the effects of variations in immigration institutional attributes, I employ a pooled data set of approximately 104 nations from 1990 to 2004. Controlling for existing explanations and regional influences, I find that domestic institutions have a significant impact on the ability of an individual to migrate to a host country and to eventually remit back to their country of origin.
Advisors/Committee Members: Whitten, Guy D. (advisor), McLean, Elena (committee member), Kellam, Marisa A. (committee member), Reinhardt, Gina Y. (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: domestic institutions; remittances; migration; capital barriers; labor barriers
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Hicks, B. N. (2011). Domestic Institutions and the Supply and Demand of Remittances. (Masters Thesis). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2009-12-7514
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Hicks, Brian N. “Domestic Institutions and the Supply and Demand of Remittances.” 2011. Masters Thesis, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2009-12-7514.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Hicks, Brian N. “Domestic Institutions and the Supply and Demand of Remittances.” 2011. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Hicks BN. Domestic Institutions and the Supply and Demand of Remittances. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Texas A&M University; 2011. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2009-12-7514.
Council of Science Editors:
Hicks BN. Domestic Institutions and the Supply and Demand of Remittances. [Masters Thesis]. Texas A&M University; 2011. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2009-12-7514
12.
Nascimento Da Silva, Thiago.
Coalitional Dynamics in Presidential Systems.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2019, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/184406
► In contrast to initial expectations, a recent literature has identified coalition formation as being almost as common in presidential systems as in parliamentary systems. However,…
(more)
▼ In contrast to initial expectations, a recent literature has identified coalition formation as being almost as common in presidential systems as in parliamentary systems. However, few studies have analyzed the dynamics of coalition governments in presidential democracies. In this dissertation, I address these dynamics, which include government formation, government breakdown, and policy monitoring between coalition partners.
Three questions are answered in this dissertation: What explains the variation in the advantage of the president’s party with regards to the allocation of ministerial posts? Why and when do presidential coalition members monitor policies being implemented by their partners? Under what conditions are cabinet coalition terminations more likely to occur in presidential systems? My answers to these questions provide important insights into the fundamental differences between presidential and parliamentary forms of government.
Advisors/Committee Members: Whitten, Guy D. (advisor), Cheibub, José Antonio (advisor), Clark, William Roberts (committee member), Escobar-Lemmon, Maria C. (committee member), Goidel, Robert Kirby (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Coalition governments; Government formation; Policy monitoring; Cabinet termination; Presidential systems; Comparative Politics; Political institutions
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APA (6th Edition):
Nascimento Da Silva, T. (2019). Coalitional Dynamics in Presidential Systems. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/184406
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Nascimento Da Silva, Thiago. “Coalitional Dynamics in Presidential Systems.” 2019. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/184406.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Nascimento Da Silva, Thiago. “Coalitional Dynamics in Presidential Systems.” 2019. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Nascimento Da Silva T. Coalitional Dynamics in Presidential Systems. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2019. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/184406.
Council of Science Editors:
Nascimento Da Silva T. Coalitional Dynamics in Presidential Systems. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2019. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/184406
13.
Williams, Laron Kenneth.
Challenging government: institutional arrangements, policy shocks, and no-confidence motions.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2009, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2366
► Our understanding of parliamentary politics suggests that no-confidence motions have a critical place in government continuation, reorganization and termination. More specifically, we know that opposition…
(more)
▼ Our understanding of parliamentary politics suggests that no-confidence motions
have a critical place in government continuation, reorganization and termination. More
specifically, we know that opposition parties use no-confidence motions as a way of
removing the government and potentially inducing early elections. Up until now, we
know little about either the causes or the consequences of no-confidence motions.
In this dissertation, I first develop a formal model of the conditions under which
an opposition party will threaten to propose (and eventually propose) a no-confidence
motion in the government. The model provides a number of intuitive observations about
the behavior of opposition parties and the reactions of governments to challenges. I
develop a competence-based theory where opposition parties signal their perception of
the government's competence with no-confidence motions. In the game, opposition
parties act both in terms of short-term gains as well as long-term electoral gains. This
model provides intuitive answers that help us understand the circumstances under which
the opposition will challenge the government. The model also provides empirical expectations regarding the probability that the motion is successful, in addition to its
long-term electoral consequences.
Next, I test the theoretical propositions regarding the occurrence of noconfidence
motions on a cross-sectional time-series data set of all no-confidence motions
in a sample of parliamentary democracies in the post-World War II era. Even though
successful no-confidence motions are relatively rare, they can have profound
consequences on policy outcomes. The next section illustrates these consequences, as I
find that having a no-confidence motion proposed against them makes governments
more likely to be targeted by other states in international conflicts. In the conclusion I
summarize the key findings, present the broad implications for the study of
parliamentary decision making, and discuss avenues for future research.
Advisors/Committee Members: Whitten, Guy D. (advisor), Engel, Jeffrey (committee member), Jenkins-Smith, Hank (committee member), Koch, Michael T. (committee member), Pacek, Alex (committee member), Walker, Robert (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: parliaments; no-confidence; opposition; conflict
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CSE |
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Williams, L. K. (2009). Challenging government: institutional arrangements, policy shocks, and no-confidence motions. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2366
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Williams, Laron Kenneth. “Challenging government: institutional arrangements, policy shocks, and no-confidence motions.” 2009. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2366.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Williams, Laron Kenneth. “Challenging government: institutional arrangements, policy shocks, and no-confidence motions.” 2009. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Williams LK. Challenging government: institutional arrangements, policy shocks, and no-confidence motions. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2009. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2366.
Council of Science Editors:
Williams LK. Challenging government: institutional arrangements, policy shocks, and no-confidence motions. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2009. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2366
Texas A&M University
14.
Clare, Joseph Daniel.
Domestic institutions, strategic interests, and international conflict.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2007, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/4866
► This dissertation explores the interactive effects of domestic audience costs and strategic interests on state behavior in international crises. I argue that the magnitude of…
(more)
▼ This dissertation explores the interactive effects of domestic audience costs and
strategic interests on state behavior in international crises. I argue that the magnitude of a
leaderâÂÂs audience costs is influenced by the level of strategic interests, which leads to
several predictions of crisis behavior in terms of (1) decisions to issue threats, including
bluffs, (2) the credibility of these threats and the willingness of opponents to resist, and
(3) crisis outcomes, including war. In the theoretical chapters, a formal model of crisis
bargaining is stylized under conditions of complete and incomplete information. Based
on this model, several novel predictions are derived regarding crisis behavior. These
predictions are quantitatively tested through a series of monadic and dyadic probit and
multinomial logit models using a dataset of deterrence crises for the period 1895-1985.
The results lend strong validity to the approach advanced here that does not consider
endogenous and exogenous factors in isolation, but rather models their interplay to
predict the dynamics of crisis behavior.
With respect to dispute initiation, the results show that strategic interests have a
much stronger influence on authoritarian leadersâ willingness to initiate disputes than they do for democracies. Moreover, the formal stylization and empirical analyses show
that democracies can and do bluff, which is in contrast to the conventional expectations
from audience cost research. Relatedly, this study specifies if and when democratic
threats are credible and how the interplay between variable domestic costs and strategic
interests can lead to deterrence success, failure, or war. While there is little difference
between the credibility of democratic and authoritarian threats at the lower level of
interests, democratic threats become more credible and less likely to be resisted as the
interests at stake increase. As for crisis outcomes, among others, war is more likely
between opponents with vital interests involved; yet even here, the predictions are not
straightforward but rather the probability of war is increasing at a differential rate for
democratic and authoritarian initiators. Whereas the formal models in this study provide
the logical rationale for these and other expectations, the quantitative findings
demonstrate their empirical validity as well.
Advisors/Committee Members: Danilovic, Vesna (advisor), Whitten, Guy D (advisor), Hermann, Charles (committee member), Tarar, Ahmer (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Domestic Politics and International Conflict; Audience Costs; Deterrence; Strategic Bargaining; Strategic Interests
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Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Clare, J. D. (2007). Domestic institutions, strategic interests, and international conflict. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/4866
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Clare, Joseph Daniel. “Domestic institutions, strategic interests, and international conflict.” 2007. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/4866.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Clare, Joseph Daniel. “Domestic institutions, strategic interests, and international conflict.” 2007. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Clare JD. Domestic institutions, strategic interests, and international conflict. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2007. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/4866.
Council of Science Editors:
Clare JD. Domestic institutions, strategic interests, and international conflict. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2007. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/4866
Texas A&M University
15.
Goerdel, Holly Thompson.
Comparing public policies in multilevel governance systems: tobacco control in the European Union.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2009, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1362
► This is a comprehensive study of tobacco control policy and politics in the European Union, 1970-2000. I develop an instrumental theory of public policy which…
(more)
▼ This is a comprehensive study of tobacco control policy and politics in the European Union, 1970-2000. I develop an instrumental theory of public policy which establishes an approach for connecting policy instruments to policy outcomes. I investigate ways in which political, bureaucratic and interest group (particularly the tobacco industry) factors influence the success of policy instruments aimed at reducing cigarette consumption. I also explore whether and how supranational mandates and directives influence the success of national-level efforts to control tobacco. I test hypotheses empirically using pooled time-series methodologies. The substantive conclusion is that non-price policies are only a qualified success when controlling for addiction, price policy and factors in the policy environment. Price policy is consistently effective, cross-nationally and the public health bureaucracy is a key player in curbing consumption of cigarettes. Major theoretical conclusions include affirmation that supranational policy actions can shape national policy outcomes, that interest group pluralism favors those with a comparative advantage in organizing (in this case, the tobacco industry), and that while policy instruments can be evaluated according to their behavioral attributes, caution should be exercised when simultaneous policy adoption is occurring.
Advisors/Committee Members: Meier, Kenneth J. (advisor), Hill, Kim Q. (committee member), Jenkins-Smith, Hank C. (committee member), Whitten, Guy D. (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: public policy; tobacco control; European Union; multilevel governance
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APA (6th Edition):
Goerdel, H. T. (2009). Comparing public policies in multilevel governance systems: tobacco control in the European Union. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1362
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Goerdel, Holly Thompson. “Comparing public policies in multilevel governance systems: tobacco control in the European Union.” 2009. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1362.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Goerdel, Holly Thompson. “Comparing public policies in multilevel governance systems: tobacco control in the European Union.” 2009. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Goerdel HT. Comparing public policies in multilevel governance systems: tobacco control in the European Union. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2009. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1362.
Council of Science Editors:
Goerdel HT. Comparing public policies in multilevel governance systems: tobacco control in the European Union. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2009. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1362
Texas A&M University
16.
Heath, Roseanna Michelle.
Explaining congressional reform: electoral laws, congressional organization, and the balance of power between party leaders and backbenchers in Latin American national legislatures.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2009, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1363
► This research addresses the question under what conditions will rank and file legislators favor or oppose changes in a legislature’s internal rules of order. The…
(more)
▼ This research addresses the question under what conditions will rank and file
legislators favor or oppose changes in a legislature’s internal rules of order. The study
deviates from previous approaches to the study of legislatures in four primary ways: 1) the
study moves from advanced democratized cases of the U.S. Congress and British House of
Commons to cases of neo-democracies; 2) the study considers the interaction between the
design of the electoral system and its impact on legislature organization; 3) in addition to
chamber level factors, party and individual level factors are considered; and 4) the theory
considers when legislators will rebel against attempts by party leadership to alter the internal
rules of order.
The central question focused on is what factors influence legislators’ willingness to
speak out or vote against changes in the internal rules of order following a change in the
electoral system design. The theory proposed that when it comes to changing the internal
rules of order of a legislative chamber, the effective number of parties in the chamber, the effect of proposed changes in the rules of order on legislator behavior, party discipline, and
the nature of legislator ambition affect the probability that change occurs.
Experimental and statistical methodologies are used to test the hypotheses derived
from the theory. Original data were collected from experiments conducted on
undergraduate pupils at
Texas A&
M University. For the statistical analyses, a data set of
proposed changes in the rules of order were compiled using archived data from the
Colombian Senate and Peruvian Congress. This multi-method approach was used because
of the nature of the question under examination and to minimize limitations of the
individual methodologies.
The experimental analyses demonstrate that the operations of the theory are
supported in the controlled environment of the experiment. The results from the statistical
analyses were, within the restrictions imposed by the data, consistent with both theoretical
expectations and the experimental findings. The most consistent factor influencing change
in the rules of order is the effect of the proposal followed by party discipline.
Advisors/Committee Members: Hill, Kim Q. (advisor), Whitten, Guy D. (advisor), Escobar-Lemmon, Maria C. (committee member), Jenkins-Smith, Hank (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Latin America; Legislative Organization
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APA ·
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MLA ·
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Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Heath, R. M. (2009). Explaining congressional reform: electoral laws, congressional organization, and the balance of power between party leaders and backbenchers in Latin American national legislatures. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1363
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Heath, Roseanna Michelle. “Explaining congressional reform: electoral laws, congressional organization, and the balance of power between party leaders and backbenchers in Latin American national legislatures.” 2009. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1363.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Heath, Roseanna Michelle. “Explaining congressional reform: electoral laws, congressional organization, and the balance of power between party leaders and backbenchers in Latin American national legislatures.” 2009. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Heath RM. Explaining congressional reform: electoral laws, congressional organization, and the balance of power between party leaders and backbenchers in Latin American national legislatures. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2009. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1363.
Council of Science Editors:
Heath RM. Explaining congressional reform: electoral laws, congressional organization, and the balance of power between party leaders and backbenchers in Latin American national legislatures. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2009. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1363
Texas A&M University
17.
McGee, Sibel.
Politics of collective belonging: loyalties in the European Union.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2007, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/4860
► Why do some citizens of the European Union feel indeed European and others do not? Although the officials of the European Union introduced many symbols…
(more)
▼ Why do some citizens of the European Union feel indeed European and
others do not? Although the officials of the European Union introduced many
symbols and discourses of unity, empirical studies show that the development of a
sense of belonging at the popular level is slow. This dissertation, by drawing upon
the established social identity theories, takes the investigation back to basics. It
develops a model consisting of the basic premises of the identity theories as well as
factors deriving from national and individual contexts that condition individual
experiences relating to the aforementioned premises. Rather than developing new
theories, this work's contribution to the study of European identity is that the study
presents as complete a model as possible based on the existing theoretical
frameworks as a cross-sectional analysis. Doing so, it unifies the disconnected
literature on the issue within a consistent theoretical logic and cross-validates the
patterns found in 15 countries through a large N multivariate analysis based on the
Eurobarometer 2000. Results yield that social identity theories are confirmed in the
case of European identity except for external demarcation principle.
Advisors/Committee Members: Robertson, John D. (advisor), Gatson, Sarah N. (committee member), Geva, Nehemia (committee member), Whitten, Guy D. (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: European Union; identity
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APA ·
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APA (6th Edition):
McGee, S. (2007). Politics of collective belonging: loyalties in the European Union. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/4860
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
McGee, Sibel. “Politics of collective belonging: loyalties in the European Union.” 2007. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/4860.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
McGee, Sibel. “Politics of collective belonging: loyalties in the European Union.” 2007. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
McGee S. Politics of collective belonging: loyalties in the European Union. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2007. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/4860.
Council of Science Editors:
McGee S. Politics of collective belonging: loyalties in the European Union. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2007. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/4860
Texas A&M University
18.
Shaykhutdinov, Renat.
Give peace a chance: the origins of territorial autonomy arrangements in multiethnic states.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2009, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1601
► This research explains the formation of territorial autonomy regimes, arrangements enabling ethnic groups to express their distinct identity. The origins of territorial autonomy arrangements is…
(more)
▼ This research explains the formation of territorial autonomy regimes,
arrangements enabling ethnic groups to express their distinct identity. The origins of
territorial autonomy arrangements is an important topic due to the great potential of such
institutions to prevent ethnic strife or reduce ongoing conflict. While the literature has
explored the consequences of autonomy regimes, its contribution to our understanding of
the origins of territorial autonomy is limited. In answering why territorial autonomy
regimes are adopted, I develop a theory that focuses on the bargaining strategies of
ethnic groups. Specifically, I posit that nonviolent bargaining strategies adopted by
ethnic groups influence national leaders’ decision-making processes. In this dissertation,
I also address the question of why ethnic groups employ peaceful, as opposed to violent,
tactics. Hypotheses derived from this theorization are tested using 197 ethnic groups in
95 states. In the empirical analysis I use data from 1945 to 2000 and employ the duration
model and the modified Heckman selection model as my primary statistical methods. To
trace the process of territorial autonomy formation I use a case study conducted in the Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation. The results suggest that while groups
with access to easily extractable resources choose to employ violent strategies, ethnic
collectivities who use peaceful protest tactics are in fact more successful in obtaining
territorial autonomy arrangements from central governments.
Advisors/Committee Members: Pacek, Alexander C. (advisor), Escobar-Lemmon, Maria C. (committee member), Geva, Nehemia (committee member), Lynham, Susan A. (committee member), Whitten, Guy D. (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: territorial autonomy; peaceful movements
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APA ·
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MLA ·
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Export
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
Manager
APA (6th Edition):
Shaykhutdinov, R. (2009). Give peace a chance: the origins of territorial autonomy arrangements in multiethnic states. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1601
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Shaykhutdinov, Renat. “Give peace a chance: the origins of territorial autonomy arrangements in multiethnic states.” 2009. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1601.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Shaykhutdinov, Renat. “Give peace a chance: the origins of territorial autonomy arrangements in multiethnic states.” 2009. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Shaykhutdinov R. Give peace a chance: the origins of territorial autonomy arrangements in multiethnic states. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2009. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1601.
Council of Science Editors:
Shaykhutdinov R. Give peace a chance: the origins of territorial autonomy arrangements in multiethnic states. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2009. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1601
Texas A&M University
19.
Attar, Riad A.
The political economy of military spending, freedom, conflicts, and economic growth in developing countries.
Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2006, Texas A&M University
URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/3969
► This study assesses the effect of politics on economic growth in developing societies. In this study I developed and applied an augmented production function model…
(more)
▼ This study assesses the effect of politics on economic growth in developing
societies. In this study I developed and applied an augmented production function model
to 69 developing countries with several political variables: regime type, institutional
freedom, political freedom, political stability, and ideological base. I investigated how
changes of political contexts affect economic growth by applying non-linear least
squares, and cross national time series techniques to the production function defensegrowth
model utilizing time series data from 1960 to 2002. The results show that the
impacts of political variables on economic growth are at least as significant as the
economic variables; the externality of non-military spending has positive and significant
impact on economic growth in the majority of countries; and the impacts of economic
and military variables and their externalities effects on economic growth differ with
different political contexts. The main findings of the study provide guidelines to policy
decision makers in evaluating their ÂgunsÂ-Âbutter alternatives.
Advisors/Committee Members: Mintz, Alex (advisor), Livesay, Harold C (committee member), Robertson, John D (committee member), Sprecher, Christopher M (committee member), Whitten, Guy D (committee member).
Subjects/Keywords: Defense; Growth
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APA (6th Edition):
Attar, R. A. (2006). The political economy of military spending, freedom, conflicts, and economic growth in developing countries. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/3969
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Attar, Riad A. “The political economy of military spending, freedom, conflicts, and economic growth in developing countries.” 2006. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed March 05, 2021.
http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/3969.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Attar, Riad A. “The political economy of military spending, freedom, conflicts, and economic growth in developing countries.” 2006. Web. 05 Mar 2021.
Vancouver:
Attar RA. The political economy of military spending, freedom, conflicts, and economic growth in developing countries. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2006. [cited 2021 Mar 05].
Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/3969.
Council of Science Editors:
Attar RA. The political economy of military spending, freedom, conflicts, and economic growth in developing countries. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2006. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/3969
. 
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