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You searched for +publisher:"Texas A&M University" +contributor:("Lipsmeyer, Christine S"). Showing records 1 – 2 of 2 total matches.

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Texas A&M University

1. Philips, Andrew Q. Manipulating the Masses: New Theories of Political Cycles.

Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2017, Texas A&M University

Despite a large literature on political cycles, many theories and empirical results conflict with one another. I address this disconnect through three interrelated contributions. I first conduct an extensive quantitative survey of the political budget cycle literature through a meta-analysis. I find that overall there exists a positive, though substantively small political budget cycle effect. Second, I examine how incumbents may use alternatives to fiscal manipulation, such as the passage of redistributive policies, since these send a key signal to voters. Third, I examine how incumbents may not only time fiscal manipulation, but control their placement spatially. This ties in the political budget cycle literature with the literature on distributive politics. Although these findings call into question some of the existing views of political budget cycles, they show that cycles manifest themselves in alternative fashions. Advisors/Committee Members: Whitten, Guy D (advisor), Lipsmeyer, Christine S (committee member), Escobar-Lemmon, Maria (committee member), Goidel, Kirby (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Political cycles; political budget cycles; political business cycles; distributive politics

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Philips, A. Q. (2017). Manipulating the Masses: New Theories of Political Cycles. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/161357

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Philips, Andrew Q. “Manipulating the Masses: New Theories of Political Cycles.” 2017. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed April 20, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/161357.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Philips, Andrew Q. “Manipulating the Masses: New Theories of Political Cycles.” 2017. Web. 20 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Philips AQ. Manipulating the Masses: New Theories of Political Cycles. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2017. [cited 2021 Apr 20]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/161357.

Council of Science Editors:

Philips AQ. Manipulating the Masses: New Theories of Political Cycles. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2017. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/161357

2. Compton, Mallory Elise. The Political Economy of Unemployment Insurance.

Degree: PhD, Political Science, 2016, Texas A&M University

In this dissertation, I examine questions of strategic political control through institutional design, government responsiveness to economic insecurity in social context, and opportunistic political control of bureaucratic performance in social insurance programs. I theorize how political divergence and economic forces influence institutional design, and how social and economic factors constrain social insurance generosity. I first offer a formal model of institutional choice— how and why policymakers choose to decentralize social insurance programs. I argue that ideological divergence leads to greater decentralization, and that institutional feedback through the establishment of vested interests encourages greater centralization. A study of the 1935 U.S. Social Security Act illustrates and supports this argument. In the second component of this project, I distinguish between civic and charitable forms of social capital, and I offer a theory of their respective effects on social policy responsiveness to macroeconomic dynamics. With novel data, I find support for my explanation, which challenges the fundamental arguments that Putnam and others have made. Lastly, I reexamine the political economy literature on political budget cycles by more closely considering the administrative mechanisms through which elected officials manipulate the provision of public goods and services. I extend research that points to an electoral cycle in government spending on social transfer programs by incorporating theory from the study of administrative political control. Politicians will be more successful in exerting pressure on bureaucrats to perform better, to be more generous, and timelier in processing unemployment insurance payments in the context of greater electoral competition and macroeconomic insecurity. By approaching unemployment policy institutions from these multiple perspectives, I further an understanding of the social, political, and economic influences on policies designed to alleviate economic insecurity. Advisors/Committee Members: Meier, Kenneth J. (advisor), Lipsmeyer, Christine S. (advisor), Whitten, Guy D. (committee member), Bowman, Ann O'M. (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: public policy; political economy; social insurance; unemployment insurance; bureaucracy

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Compton, M. E. (2016). The Political Economy of Unemployment Insurance. (Doctoral Dissertation). Texas A&M University. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/158029

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Compton, Mallory Elise. “The Political Economy of Unemployment Insurance.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University. Accessed April 20, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/158029.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Compton, Mallory Elise. “The Political Economy of Unemployment Insurance.” 2016. Web. 20 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Compton ME. The Political Economy of Unemployment Insurance. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2016. [cited 2021 Apr 20]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/158029.

Council of Science Editors:

Compton ME. The Political Economy of Unemployment Insurance. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Texas A&M University; 2016. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/158029

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