Open Access Theses and Dissertations

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You searched for +publisher:"Penn State University" +contributor:("Kai Du, Committee Member"). Showing records 1 – 3 of 3 total matches.

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Penn State University

1. Jiang, Xin. Fund Managers' Disclosures.

Degree: 2018, Penn State University

URL: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/15575xuj106 

It is unclear why some privately-informed fund managers publicly reveal private information before they have �finished accumulating their position in a stock that they believe to be mis-valued. In this dissertation, I model a fund manager as an informed trader and propose a rational explanation for this phenomenon based on the differing importance to fund managers of short-term paper pro�ts and long-term trading pro�ts. I study an informed trader's voluntary disclosure using a variant of a two-period Kyle (1985) model. The fi�ndings of this dissertation demonstrate that an informed trader's public disclosure depends on the relative weight she places on short-term paper pro�ts, i.e., her degree of short-termism. Above a threshold weight, she prefers to disclose. Further, the precision of the informed trader's disclosure increases with her degree of short-termism. Short-termism on the part of the informed investor leads to (i) lower liquidity before disclosure, and (ii) higher price informativeness both before and after disclosure. I also examine the informed trader's trading strategies when she is mandated to disclose her portfolio holdings immediately after her trades. In this case, it is optimal for the informed trader to inject a random component into her trade before disclosure in order to preserve some of her information advantage.Additionally, the extent to which the informed trader randomizes decreases with her degree of short-termism. Advisors/Committee Members: Steven J Huddart, Dissertation Advisor/Co-Advisor, Steven J Huddart, Committee Chair/Co-Chair, Dan Givoly, Committee Member, Kai Du, Committee Member, Russell Wade Cooper, Outside Member.

Subjects/Keywords: Fund managers; Disclosure; Short-termism

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Jiang, X. (2018). Fund Managers' Disclosures. (Thesis). Penn State University. Retrieved from https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/15575xuj106

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Jiang, Xin. “Fund Managers' Disclosures.” 2018. Thesis, Penn State University. Accessed April 17, 2021. https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/15575xuj106.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Jiang, Xin. “Fund Managers' Disclosures.” 2018. Web. 17 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Jiang X. Fund Managers' Disclosures. [Internet] [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2018. [cited 2021 Apr 17]. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/15575xuj106.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Jiang X. Fund Managers' Disclosures. [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2018. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/15575xuj106

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation


Penn State University

2. Flasher, Renee. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Insights into the Inspection Process, Environment, and Reports.

Degree: 2013, Penn State University

URL: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/19417 

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) performs inspections of accounting firms with fewer than 100 clients listed on an American stock exchange on a three-year cycle. The inspections of the audit work of these firms (hereafter, small public practice firms) are the focus of this study. Theory models the interactions between an inspected entity and an inspector either as static, with independent interactions, or dynamic, with continuous learning among parties throughout multiple inspection cycles. Because three years pass between inspections, prior inspection results may be irrelevant to the current inspection. If the inspectors rely on recent information supplied by the small public practice firm to plan and execute the current inspection, a static view might characterize the relationship between the PCAOB and the firm. On the other hand, a dynamic relationship encourages past PCAOB inspections to influence current interactions with the firm. I posit that a firm that received a clean prior inspection outcome, i.e., no engagement deficiencies or quality control issues, is less likely to have an increase in the number of audit clients inspected during the current inspection than firms that received other prior inspection outcomes. Controlling for the current client portfolio characteristics, I find that an average firm with a prior clean report has a 6% decrease in the probability of an increase in the number of client files inspected with the current inspection as compared to firms with different prior inspection outcomes. This finding provides evidence consistent with a dynamic relationship among the PCAOB and the firms. For practitioners, these results show that the PCAOB conditions subsequent inspections on past inspection results. The inspection process and frequency for small public practice firms does not depend on whether the firm is headquartered in the United States (US) or abroad. I examine the impact of a home country regulator on foreign firm inspection reports issued by the PCAOB. Some foreign regulators are similar to the PCAOB. A PCAOB-like regulator belongs to the International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators and employs personnel to inspect accounting firms. Alternative regulatory regimes include regulators that indirectly oversee the accounting firms through an intermediary professional organization. I hypothesize and find evidence that foreign firms subject to PCAOB-like regulator are more likely to receive a clean inspection outcome from the PCAOB as compared to foreign firms in alternative regulatory environments. For the average firm, a PCAOB-like regulator increases the probability of a clean PCAOB inspection outcome by 21% as compared to an engagement deficient outcome. However, I find no evidence that the regulatory environment otherwise impacts the probability of a clean inspection outcome as compared to a quality deficient inspection outcome. The association between the home country regulatory environment and PCAOB inspection outcomes provides… Advisors/Committee Members: Steven J Huddart, Dissertation Advisor/Co-Advisor, Steven J Huddart, Committee Chair/Co-Chair, Mark William Dirsmith, Committee Member, Kai Du, Committee Member, Debashis Ghosh, Committee Member.

Subjects/Keywords: PCAOB; Inspections; Role Ambiguity; International; Audit Firms

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Flasher, R. (2013). Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Insights into the Inspection Process, Environment, and Reports. (Thesis). Penn State University. Retrieved from https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/19417

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Flasher, Renee. “Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Insights into the Inspection Process, Environment, and Reports.” 2013. Thesis, Penn State University. Accessed April 17, 2021. https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/19417.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Flasher, Renee. “Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Insights into the Inspection Process, Environment, and Reports.” 2013. Web. 17 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Flasher R. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Insights into the Inspection Process, Environment, and Reports. [Internet] [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2013. [cited 2021 Apr 17]. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/19417.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Flasher R. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Insights into the Inspection Process, Environment, and Reports. [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2013. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/19417

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation


Penn State University

3. Rhodes, Adrienne Cheri. The relation between the firm's debt contracts and the CEO's compensation contract.

Degree: 2013, Penn State University

URL: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/19792 

The likelihood that tripping a debt covenant would precipitate the dismissal of top management provides an implicit incentive for managers to perform that is incremental to the explicit incentives in compensation contracts. In this thesis, I investigate how the implicit incentives provided by the firm’s long-term debt contracts relate to the structure of the compensation contract struck between the CEO and the shareholders. This provides a new and unique view of how the CEO’s incentives are shaped by not only his compensation contract but also the debt contracts negotiated with the firm’s debtholders. In the second chapter, I examine the sensitivity of the CEO’s cash compensation to earnings and earnings-based covenants in the firm’s debt contracts. When the debt contract contains an earnings-based covenant, the sensitivity of the CEO’s pay to earnings is muted. This reflects the influence of earnings-based covenants on the CEO’s incentives to maintain earnings. On average, a one-percentage point increase in ROA increases the CEO’s cash compensation by 3.6 percent. In contrast, in firms with earnings-based covenants, a one-percentage point increase in ROA relates to an increase in cash compensation of only 1.9 percent. The third chapter examines how debt contract covenants relate to the CEO’s equity compensation. I find a weakly significant positive relation between performance-based covenants and the CEO’s equity compensation. Additionally, I find that the CEO’s equity compensation is weighted more heavily with options than stock when the firm’s debt contracts contain performance-based covenants. The findings in this thesis should be of interest to researchers and shareholders who strive to understand how the CEO’s incentives are shaped by the contracts under which he operates. Additionally, the findings in this thesis illustrate a setting where the use of earnings in one contract setting influences the use of earnings in another contract setting. Advisors/Committee Members: Steven J Huddart, Dissertation Advisor/Co-Advisor, Steven J Huddart, Committee Chair/Co-Chair, Keith John Crocker, Committee Member, Hong Qu, Committee Member, Kai Du, Committee Member.

Subjects/Keywords: Executive compensation; agency theory; debt contracts; incentive contracts

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Rhodes, A. C. (2013). The relation between the firm's debt contracts and the CEO's compensation contract. (Thesis). Penn State University. Retrieved from https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/19792

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Rhodes, Adrienne Cheri. “The relation between the firm's debt contracts and the CEO's compensation contract.” 2013. Thesis, Penn State University. Accessed April 17, 2021. https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/19792.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Rhodes, Adrienne Cheri. “The relation between the firm's debt contracts and the CEO's compensation contract.” 2013. Web. 17 Apr 2021.

Vancouver:

Rhodes AC. The relation between the firm's debt contracts and the CEO's compensation contract. [Internet] [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2013. [cited 2021 Apr 17]. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/19792.

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

Council of Science Editors:

Rhodes AC. The relation between the firm's debt contracts and the CEO's compensation contract. [Thesis]. Penn State University; 2013. Available from: https://submit-etda.libraries.psu.edu/catalog/19792

Note: this citation may be lacking information needed for this citation format:
Not specified: Masters Thesis or Doctoral Dissertation

.