Attacks against nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in high-risk conflict zones have increased exponentially over the last two decades. However, the few existing empirical studies on NGO insecurity have tended to focus on external factors influencing attacks, with little attention paid to the actions of aid workers themselves. To fill this gap, this dissertation theorizes that aid workers may have contributed to their own insecurity by engaging in greater political action. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are used to assess the impact of political activity by NGOs on the insecurity of aid workers. The quantitative analyses test the theory at two levels. The first is a large-N country-level analysis of 117 nations from 1999 to 2015 using panel corrected standard errors. The second is a subnational-level statistical analysis of four case studies: Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Colombia from 2000 to 2014. Both the country- and provincial- level analyses show that the magnitude of aid tends to be a significant determinant of aid worker security. The qualitative methods of “structured-focused comparison” and “process tracing” are used to analyze the four cases. Results show that aid workers are most likely to be victims of politically-motivated attacks while in-transit. Consistent with the quantitative findings, it is speculated that if workers are engaged in a large-scale project over an extended period of time, attackers will be able to monitor their daily activities and routines closely, making it easier to orchestrate a successful ambush. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that political statements made by NGOs—regardless of their sectors of activity—have increased insecurity for the broader aid community. These results dispel the myth that humanitarian activity has historically been independent, impartial, and neutral. Several NGOs have relied on this false assumption for security, believing that adherence to core principles has contributed to “humanitarian space.” The results also dispel the popular NGO assumption that targeted attacks are not official tactics of organized militants, but rather the result of criminality or mistaken identity. In fact, the overwhelming majority of aid workers attacked in high-risk conflict zones have been targeted by political actors. Advisors/Committee Members: Emizet F. Kisangani.

Why are states sometimes unable to avoid the occurrence of civil war? Most existing theories of civil war focus on rebels’ motivation and capabilities, while taking government’s actions as givens. Not only is the government a key player in the process leading up to civil war, but it is also a non-unitary actor composed of individuals and groups with diverging aspirations. Thus, understanding civil war requires an explanation of the conditions that facilitate or impede what governments do to provide political order. To fill this gap, this dissertation proposes a state-centered theory that explains civil war as an indirect function of state environment, defined in terms of structural and institutional conditions under which governments operate. The argument is that state environment determines the scope of leaders’ consensus on accommodation and coercion, two strategies that governments rely on to provide political order. Specifically, harsh socioeconomic conditions reduce leaders’ strategic consensus. Moreover, leaders’ divisions in socioeconomically poor societies is further exacerbated by democratic institutions. In turn, the lack of consensus on accommodation and coercion increases the risks of civil war. Quantitative and qualitative methods are used to test the theory. The quantitative analysis relies on mediation techniques and on a cross-sectional time series of 162 countries from 1960 to 2007. The results support the theoretical argument. Socioeconomic development is indirectly and inversely related to civil war. About two-thirds of its effect is transmitted through accommodation, while one-third occurs through coercion. Moreover, democratic institutions are positively associated with civil war. When socioeconomic development is low, states with open institutions are the least accommodative and the most coercive. The qualitative methods of “structured, focused comparison” and “process tracing” are used to investigate three cases (Côte d’Ivoire, Romania, and Benin). The findings show that the emergence of sociopolitical dissidence often results from changes in the structure of the state’s socioeconomic or political environment. However, the risks of escalation into civil war are highest when leaders lack consensus about a strategy to resolve the issue at stake. In turn, leaders’ disunity about a bargaining strategy is found to be a product of calculations for political survival. Advisors/Committee Members: Emizet F. Kisangani.