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You searched for +publisher:"Harvard University" +contributor:("Miller, Steven E."). Showing records 1 – 2 of 2 total matches.

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Harvard University

1. Lee, Christy L. Posturing for Prevention: Extended Claim on the Use of Force Against the Threats of Nuclear Terrorism.

Degree: ALM, 2017, Harvard University

The threat of terrorism, nuclear weapons program by hostile states, and the possibility that these threats could aggregate and converge into more devastating threat of nuclear terrorism has been challenging the international norm on the use of force. The characteristics of these threats dictate that they are not the kinds of threat that can be waited upon to manifest because the stage of their imminence would render a state unable to defend itself by using force as the last resort. To prevent the distinct threats from becoming prevalent throughout the globe and growing into a greater threat, the permissible parameters for the use of force must include the conditions of when and how force can be used effectively in combating these threats. These permissible conditions increasingly depend on placing a greater premium on states' responsibility toward violence that streams outside their territories and strengthening enforcement mechanisms toward state responsibility and accountability so that, if breached to cause disproportionate violence in civilian lives, a claim on force could be extended to prevent their present capabilities from inflicting greater harm in the future based on their intent of causing violence demonstrated in their past acts of aggression. The legitimacy of using force to prevent the threats of modern security environment rests on the extent of increasing and enforcing state responsibility and demonstrating that states that inflicted violence and violated international norms in the past and associated with terrorist activities and pursue nuclear weapons technology for hostile purposes in the present are highly likely to perpetuate recurrent attacks in the future. The permissible preventive use of force that would be contingent upon states' breach of responsibility to cause recurrent aggression depends on the process of reinterpreting the pre-existing international norm on the use of force and enforcing state responsibility over the governance of its internal domestic affairs toward stricter adherence toward maintaining international peace and security. Advisors/Committee Members: Ostrowski, Don (committee member), Miller, Steven E. (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Political Science, International Law and Relations; Political Science, General

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Lee, C. L. (2017). Posturing for Prevention: Extended Claim on the Use of Force Against the Threats of Nuclear Terrorism. (Masters Thesis). Harvard University. Retrieved from http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33826994

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Lee, Christy L. “Posturing for Prevention: Extended Claim on the Use of Force Against the Threats of Nuclear Terrorism.” 2017. Masters Thesis, Harvard University. Accessed August 11, 2020. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33826994.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Lee, Christy L. “Posturing for Prevention: Extended Claim on the Use of Force Against the Threats of Nuclear Terrorism.” 2017. Web. 11 Aug 2020.

Vancouver:

Lee CL. Posturing for Prevention: Extended Claim on the Use of Force Against the Threats of Nuclear Terrorism. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Harvard University; 2017. [cited 2020 Aug 11]. Available from: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33826994.

Council of Science Editors:

Lee CL. Posturing for Prevention: Extended Claim on the Use of Force Against the Threats of Nuclear Terrorism. [Masters Thesis]. Harvard University; 2017. Available from: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33826994


Harvard University

2. Facini, Andrew. Restraint by Design: The Long-Lasting Ideological Origins of the “Minimum Deterrence” Strategy in China’s Nuclear Weapons Program.

Degree: ALM, 2018, Harvard University

The nuclear weapons program of the People’s Republic of China has, by the decrees and proclamations of its leaders, maintained an ardently defensive posture for over 50 years. Through difficult times and various crises, Beijing has declined to pursue a large stockpile of nuclear warheads and delivery systems, opting instead to field a system of “high quality but low quantity.” This novel approach contrasted with the approaches of its chief rivals, the United States and the Soviet Union. The goal of this project is to investigate the qualitative motivations for Beijing’s unique disposition, hypothesizing that the Maoist ideologies which shaped the PRC’s development so heavily are responsible. By analyzing the statements of its leaders and corresponding those with historical developments and the ongoing evolution of China’s weapons systems, this project reveals an ideological dilemma: that the very concept of nuclear arms conflicted with Mao’s strong philosophies on conflict and development. Over several decades of conflict, chiefly with the United States, Mao reluctantly turned to nuclear weapons as a means of solidifying his own sovereignty and establishing China’s place in the world order. As the PRC continued to develop in the post-Mao eras, however, his original reluctance has remained, as China’s nuclear weapons maintained its defensive posture and relied on the then-unique approach of “minimum deterrence.” The author concludes that the case of China’s unique, long-lasting philosophy when it comes to nuclear weapons represents a break in the typically realist view of the field, and can offer helpful insights for deciphering the motivations China’s modern-day developments and policies.

International Relations

Advisors/Committee Members: Miller, Steven E. (committee member), Bond, Doug (committee member).

Subjects/Keywords: Chinese nuclear weapons; People's Republic of China; nuclear proliferation; deterrence

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Facini, A. (2018). Restraint by Design: The Long-Lasting Ideological Origins of the “Minimum Deterrence” Strategy in China’s Nuclear Weapons Program. (Masters Thesis). Harvard University. Retrieved from http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:42004016

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Facini, Andrew. “Restraint by Design: The Long-Lasting Ideological Origins of the “Minimum Deterrence” Strategy in China’s Nuclear Weapons Program.” 2018. Masters Thesis, Harvard University. Accessed August 11, 2020. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:42004016.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Facini, Andrew. “Restraint by Design: The Long-Lasting Ideological Origins of the “Minimum Deterrence” Strategy in China’s Nuclear Weapons Program.” 2018. Web. 11 Aug 2020.

Vancouver:

Facini A. Restraint by Design: The Long-Lasting Ideological Origins of the “Minimum Deterrence” Strategy in China’s Nuclear Weapons Program. [Internet] [Masters thesis]. Harvard University; 2018. [cited 2020 Aug 11]. Available from: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:42004016.

Council of Science Editors:

Facini A. Restraint by Design: The Long-Lasting Ideological Origins of the “Minimum Deterrence” Strategy in China’s Nuclear Weapons Program. [Masters Thesis]. Harvard University; 2018. Available from: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:42004016

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