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You searched for +publisher:"Georgia State University" +contributor:("Ivo D. Tafkov"). Showing records 1 – 3 of 3 total matches.

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1. McPhee, Gregory P. The Effects of Non-cash Incentives, Payoff Timing, and Task Type on Performance.

Degree: PhD, Accountancy, 2013, Georgia State University

My study investigates whether the effects of non-cash incentives on employee performance depend on when the incentive is paid and what type of task is being performed. Although firms frequently use non-cash incentives, such as merchandise, travel awards and gift cards, the effects of non-cash incentives, relative to cash incentives, are not well understood by researchers. Drawing on economic and psychology theories, I predict that the effects of incentive type (cash or non-cash) on performance depend on incentive payoff timing (near or distant future) and task type (analytic or creative). Specifically, for an analytic task, I predict and find that a cash incentive paid in the near future is most effective. For a creative task, I predict and find that a cash incentive paid in the near future and a non-cash incentive paid in the distant future are most effective. The results of my study should benefit theory and practice by identifying the most effective combination of incentive type and payoff timing for a given task type. Advisors/Committee Members: Dr. R. Lynn Hannan, Dr. Ivo D. Tafkov, Dr. Jennifer R. Joe, Dr. Detmar W. Straub.

Subjects/Keywords: Non-cash Incentives; Creativity; Deferred Compensation; Performance

…Committee Co-Chairs: Dr. R. Lynn Hannan (Co-Chair) Dr. Ivo D. Tafkov (Co-Chair)… 

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

McPhee, G. P. (2013). The Effects of Non-cash Incentives, Payoff Timing, and Task Type on Performance. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/accountancy_diss/12

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

McPhee, Gregory P. “The Effects of Non-cash Incentives, Payoff Timing, and Task Type on Performance.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia State University. Accessed March 25, 2019. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/accountancy_diss/12.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

McPhee, Gregory P. “The Effects of Non-cash Incentives, Payoff Timing, and Task Type on Performance.” 2013. Web. 25 Mar 2019.

Vancouver:

McPhee GP. The Effects of Non-cash Incentives, Payoff Timing, and Task Type on Performance. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2013. [cited 2019 Mar 25]. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/accountancy_diss/12.

Council of Science Editors:

McPhee GP. The Effects of Non-cash Incentives, Payoff Timing, and Task Type on Performance. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2013. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/accountancy_diss/12


Georgia State University

2. Smith, Stuart. Can a Code of Ethics Reduce Sabotage and Increase Productivity under Tournament-Based Compensation? An Experimental Study.

Degree: PhD, Accountancy, 2016, Georgia State University

Managers have often used tournament incentive programs because of their ability to attract top talent and motivate employees to give their best effort (Grote 2005; McGregor 2006; Ng and Lublin 2010). However, because a tournament incentive structure explicitly evokes competition, prior economic literature has shown that the harmful effects of sabotage observed during a tournament can completely negate any benefits they have (Carpenter et al. 2010). The remedies suggested to reduce sabotage involve reducing the economic incentives that contribute to both beneficial and harmful behavior (Chen 2003). In the accounting literature to date, no remedy for the harmful effects of a tournament incentive has been investigated because the ability to sabotage has been restricted by way of tight experimental control. I utilize an experiment in which participants perform a real effort task which allows them to sabotage each other and receive relative performance feedback in real-time. I first predict that sabotage during a tournament will be higher than fixed pay because of the higher incentive to sabotage during a tournament. I then predict that by employing a code of ethics, I can activate the social norm of promise keeping which discourages those in a tournament from engaging in sabotage, while still giving their best effort. In the majority of cases, this allows the company to reap the previously observed benefits of a tournament incentive, while minimizing the previously observed costs that normally accompany a tournament incentive. However, I unexpectedly discover that a code of ethics can be able double-edge sword; In so much that, if violations persist despite certifications to follow the code, participants may become more discouraged and their behavior more detrimentally effects productivity than if those same violations occurred without a code. The implications of employing a code of ethics under these two incentive systems on overall productivity is explored. Advisors/Committee Members: Douglas E. Stevens, Michael J. Majerczyk, Ivo D. Tafkov, Jeffrey Hales.

Subjects/Keywords: sabotage; tournament; code of ethics; social norm activation

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Smith, S. (2016). Can a Code of Ethics Reduce Sabotage and Increase Productivity under Tournament-Based Compensation? An Experimental Study. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/accountancy_diss/19

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Smith, Stuart. “Can a Code of Ethics Reduce Sabotage and Increase Productivity under Tournament-Based Compensation? An Experimental Study.” 2016. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia State University. Accessed March 25, 2019. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/accountancy_diss/19.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Smith, Stuart. “Can a Code of Ethics Reduce Sabotage and Increase Productivity under Tournament-Based Compensation? An Experimental Study.” 2016. Web. 25 Mar 2019.

Vancouver:

Smith S. Can a Code of Ethics Reduce Sabotage and Increase Productivity under Tournament-Based Compensation? An Experimental Study. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2016. [cited 2019 Mar 25]. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/accountancy_diss/19.

Council of Science Editors:

Smith S. Can a Code of Ethics Reduce Sabotage and Increase Productivity under Tournament-Based Compensation? An Experimental Study. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2016. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/accountancy_diss/19


Georgia State University

3. Zhang, Zhen. Do as I say, not as I do? Supervisory behavioral integrity, shared financial interests, and subordinate honesty in budget reporting.

Degree: PhD, Accountancy, 2015, Georgia State University

Participative budgeting plays an important role for information communication among hierarchies in organizations. In this study, I use a lab experiment to examine three research questions and investigate the role of supervisors in influencing subordinate honesty. First, I predict and find support that supervisory behavioral integrity, i.e. the alignment between a superior’s communication of a value of honesty and the superior’s behavioral honesty, is an effective informal control mechanism to influence employee honesty. However, the effectiveness of supervisory behavioral integrity in influencing employee honesty depends on the presence of shared financial interests between the superior and the subordinates, such that high supervisory behavioral integrity may promote employee honesty only in the presence of shared financial interests. In the absence of shared financial interests, supervisory behavioral integrity is no longer effective in influencing employee honesty. Finally, I investigate whether supervisory behavioral integrity, compared to supervisory behavioral honesty, has incremental effect on subordinate honesty. The results suggest that, compared to supervisory behavioral honesty, supervisory behavioral integrity has a stronger influence on subordinate honesty. Furthermore, high supervisory behavioral honesty is shown to have a demotion effect on subordinate honesty, i.e. subordinate honesty is lower when superior’s honesty is high than when it is low. Supplemental analysis provides potential explanations for the demotion effect. The implications of the findings for management accounting research and practice are discussed. Advisors/Committee Members: Ivo D. Tafkov, Douglas E. Stevens.

Subjects/Keywords: Supervisory behavioral integrity; budgeting honesty; psychological distance; superior honesty

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Zhang, Z. (2015). Do as I say, not as I do? Supervisory behavioral integrity, shared financial interests, and subordinate honesty in budget reporting. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/accountancy_diss/17

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Zhang, Zhen. “Do as I say, not as I do? Supervisory behavioral integrity, shared financial interests, and subordinate honesty in budget reporting.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia State University. Accessed March 25, 2019. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/accountancy_diss/17.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Zhang, Zhen. “Do as I say, not as I do? Supervisory behavioral integrity, shared financial interests, and subordinate honesty in budget reporting.” 2015. Web. 25 Mar 2019.

Vancouver:

Zhang Z. Do as I say, not as I do? Supervisory behavioral integrity, shared financial interests, and subordinate honesty in budget reporting. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2015. [cited 2019 Mar 25]. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/accountancy_diss/17.

Council of Science Editors:

Zhang Z. Do as I say, not as I do? Supervisory behavioral integrity, shared financial interests, and subordinate honesty in budget reporting. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2015. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/accountancy_diss/17

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