+publisher:"Georgia State University" +contributor:("Dr. Yongsheng Xu")

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Georgia State University

1. Calvet, Roberta D. Studies on the Effects of Sympathy and Religious Education on Income Redistribution Preferences, Charitable Donations, and Law-Abiding Behavior.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2011, Georgia State University

URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/74

► The purpose of this dissertation is to identify the impact of moral emotions (sympathy and empathy) and religious education on individual behavior. This dissertation… (more)

▼ The purpose of this dissertation is to identify the impact of moral emotions (sympathy and empathy) and religious education on individual behavior. This dissertation is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter examines the effect of sympathy and empathy on tax compliance. We run a series of experiments in which we employ methods such as priming, the Davis Empathic Concern scale, and questions about frequency of prosocial behaviors in the past year in order to promote and to identify empathy and sympathy in subjects. We observe the subjects’ decisions in a series of one-shot tax compliance game presented at once and with no immediate feedback. Our results suggest that the presence and/or the promotion of sympathy in most cases encourage tax compliance. The second chapter takes into consideration religious schooling as a way of helping the development of religiosity or morality on individuals. Our intent is to investigate the effect of religious education on charitable donations in adulthood. Our empirical analysis is based on data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics dataset. Our estimation results indicate that there is a positive effect of religious education on donations to secular and religious organizations. The third chapter explores the hypothesis that sympathetic individuals are more likely to support income redistribution because they believe that the poor may benefit from this policy. We use data from the General Social Survey to estimate support for income distribution. Our results suggest that some measures of sympathy have a positive effect on support for redistribution. Across all three main chapters, we find that sympathy has mostly small and positive effects on the types of behavior examined in this dissertation, although we are not able to determine the impact of religious education on charitable donations. Despite the sometimes weak results of this research caused by the limitations of the available data and the complexity of the issues studied, we believe that the development of these moral emotions is likely to generate benefits to society. Advisors/Committee Members: Dr. James R. Alm, Dr. Sally Wallace, Dr. C. Monica Capra, Dr. Yongsheng Xu.

Subjects/Keywords: morality; emotions; tax compliance; charitable donations; income redistribution preferences; religious education; Economics

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APA (6^th Edition):

Calvet, R. D. (2011). Studies on the Effects of Sympathy and Religious Education on Income Redistribution Preferences, Charitable Donations, and Law-Abiding Behavior. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/74

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Calvet, Roberta D. “Studies on the Effects of Sympathy and Religious Education on Income Redistribution Preferences, Charitable Donations, and Law-Abiding Behavior.” 2011. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia State University. Accessed February 19, 2019. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/74.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Calvet, Roberta D. “Studies on the Effects of Sympathy and Religious Education on Income Redistribution Preferences, Charitable Donations, and Law-Abiding Behavior.” 2011. Web. 19 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Calvet RD. Studies on the Effects of Sympathy and Religious Education on Income Redistribution Preferences, Charitable Donations, and Law-Abiding Behavior. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2011. [cited 2019 Feb 19]. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/74.

Council of Science Editors:

Calvet RD. Studies on the Effects of Sympathy and Religious Education on Income Redistribution Preferences, Charitable Donations, and Law-Abiding Behavior. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2011. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/74

Georgia State University

2. Turner, Sean C. Essays on Crime and Tax Evasion.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2010, Georgia State University

URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/64

► This dissertation consists of three essays addressing two issues related to crime and tax evasion. The first essay investigates the relationship between property and violent… (more)

▼ This dissertation consists of three essays addressing two issues related to crime and tax evasion. The first essay investigates the relationship between property and violent crime with law enforcement expenditures. The second essay examines the market structure in transition economies and the effects on firm-level tax evasion. The third essay investigates the incidence of tax evasion in a general equilibrium framework. The topics in all three essays are linked by their focus on criminal or illegal behavior. The essays also answer questions related to developing sound governmental policy and decision-making. Chapter one attempts to identify the impact on crime of increasing law enforcement expenditures. We examine the specific channels the public has to influence crime (e.g., the level of expenditures, the number of police officers), to determine what role, if any, they may play in influencing crime rates for property crime and for violent crime. Conclusions in previous research are equivocal, and often do not adequately address the obvious simultaneity of crime and enforcement efforts. We use the Arellano-Bond system GMM estimation method to control for this simultaneity. Results from our preferred GMM estimation method show clearly that increases in law enforcement expenditures help reduce crime rates; other methodologies typically give results that are not robust. The second chapter extends previous empirical work evaluating the determinants of tax evasion by firms in which tax evasion may be similar to a tax advantage under the law. This chapter contributes to the tax evasion literature by identifying market structures in which it may be easier to evade or where high levels of evasion take place. Results indicate that fighting corruption is still an important factor in determining the level of evasion. However, the data also suggests a long run situation in which the tax advantage of evasion has been replicated and competed away; more competitive markets have lower levels of evasion whereas monopolistic markets have higher levels of evasion. Further, tax evasion will occur in more service oriented industries. Chapter three develops and calibrates a general equilibrium model to investigate how tax evasion affects the incidence of taxes. Previous tax incidence work has considered tax evasion; however little has been done considering the distributional impact of tax evasion. There may be cases in which individuals, other than evaders, indirectly benefit or lose from tax evasion. This work contributes to the literature by clearly linking the individual or firm decision to evade to a general equilibrium analysis of tax evasion using microeconomic foundations. Including evasion decisions in tax incidence analysis has implications for both tax policy and enforcement agency decision making, and is an important step toward understanding how evasion affects the whole economy. Advisors/Committee Members: Dr. James R. Alm, Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez, Dr. Yongsheng Xu, Dr. Martin F. Grace.

Subjects/Keywords: Tax Evasion; Crime; Public Finance; Economics

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APA (6^th Edition):

Turner, S. C. (2010). Essays on Crime and Tax Evasion. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/64

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Turner, Sean C. “Essays on Crime and Tax Evasion.” 2010. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia State University. Accessed February 19, 2019. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/64.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Turner, Sean C. “Essays on Crime and Tax Evasion.” 2010. Web. 19 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Turner SC. Essays on Crime and Tax Evasion. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2010. [cited 2019 Feb 19]. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/64.

Council of Science Editors:

Turner SC. Essays on Crime and Tax Evasion. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2010. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/64

Georgia State University

3. Jin, Yinghua. A Comparative Study of Fiscal Decentralization in China and India.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2009, Georgia State University

URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/57

► This dissertation provides an empirical test of the effects of fiscal decentralization and horizontal fiscal equalization on economic growth and examines the potential trade-off between… (more)

▼ This dissertation provides an empirical test of the effects of fiscal decentralization and horizontal fiscal equalization on economic growth and examines the potential trade-off between horizontal fiscal equalization and economic growth in both China and India. Chapter II examines the effects of both fiscal decentralization and horizontal fiscal equalization on economic growth in China, particularly the effect of the Tax Sharing System reform enacted in 1994. Compared with previous studies, using more complete data providing better measures and more econometrically sophisticated instrumental variable procedures, we find that there is no substantial evidence of a trade-off between horizontal fiscal equalization and growth. The 1994 Tax Sharing System reform has positively contributed to both economic growth and horizontal fiscal equalization. In addition, we find that fiscal decentralization (FD) has a non-linear effect on growth. For values of FD less than 21, fiscal decentralization has a negative effect on growth, but for values greater than 21, fiscal decentralization has a positive effect on growth. Chapter III examines the effects of both fiscal decentralization and horizontal fiscal equalization on economic growth in India, particularly the effects of the 1991 economic reforms. Using state-wide data covering the period from 1980 through 2005, we find that fiscal decentralization has a negative effect on economic growth initially but that, beyond a certain value of fiscal decentralization, the effect on growth becomes positive. However, further decentralization could have a negative effect on horizontal fiscal equalization. These results are robust. In the meanwhile, there is no evidence of a trade-off between horizontal fiscal equalization and economic growth; instead, there is evidence of a positive effect of economic growth on equalization. In addition, the 1991 economic reform has contributed to economic growth. A comparative study of China and India has shown that the degree of fiscal decentralization in both countries is far from the point where its effect on economic growth becomes positive. Despite the dangers of widening disparities in terms of interregional fiscal resource distribution from further decentralization, no substantial evidence shows a trade-off between horizontal fiscal equalization and growth in either country. An in-depth and more thorough going fiscal decentralization with greater emphasis on equalization of fiscal disparities are required in order to effect sustainable economic growth as well as social harmony in these two Asian countries. Advisors/Committee Members: Dr. Mark W. Rider - Committee Chair, Dr. Penelope B. Prime - Committee Member, Dr. Roy W. Bahl - Committee Member, Dr. Shiferaw Gurmu - Committee Member, Dr. Yongsheng Xu - Committee Member.

Subjects/Keywords: horizontal fiscal equalization; growth; fiscal decentralization; Economics

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APA (6^th Edition):

Jin, Y. (2009). A Comparative Study of Fiscal Decentralization in China and India. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/57

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Jin, Yinghua. “A Comparative Study of Fiscal Decentralization in China and India.” 2009. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia State University. Accessed February 19, 2019. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/57.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Jin, Yinghua. “A Comparative Study of Fiscal Decentralization in China and India.” 2009. Web. 19 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Jin Y. A Comparative Study of Fiscal Decentralization in China and India. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2009. [cited 2019 Feb 19]. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/57.

Council of Science Editors:

Jin Y. A Comparative Study of Fiscal Decentralization in China and India. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2009. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/57

4. Tasik, Hizkia. Essays on Information Asymmetry and Welfare Benefit.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2015, Georgia State University

URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/110

► This dissertation explores the information asymmetry problem between government and applicants of means-tested welfare benefits. The first chapter examines the problem in a static… (more)

▼ This dissertation explores the information asymmetry problem between government and applicants of means-tested welfare benefits. The first chapter examines the problem in a static setting. To meet benefit eligibility, individuals reduce their labor supply so that they meet the required income level. This action enables them to increase their payoff but makes it difficult for government to differentiate the needy from the non-needy. Using a signaling game model and incorporating income-related ordeals (i.e. required-hour and essential component) as the signals, this study finds that government can mitigate the problem, increase social welfare, and maintain income-based eligibility requirements. The second chapter investigates the effect of the asymmetry when benefit applicants have choices of where and when to apply, and the solution to the asymmetry problem. Jurisdiction differential in net benefit may induce a migration from a low to a high net-benefit jurisdiction. Likewise, individuals may choose to procrastinate on the application process if they find that applying later gives higher net-benefit than applying now. Consequently, these behaviors create information asymmetry. Using a signaling game model, the result shows that, after accounting for required-hour and essential component, the individuals have no incentive to migrate or procrastinate on the application process in order to be eligible. The third chapter evaluates the solution to the problem when maintaining a particular take-up rate is also a government’s objective. Imposing ordeal in the welfare system is expected to help government direct the benefit to the needy but this may reduce the take-up rate. Conditioning on any particular take-up rate that the government aims to achieve, the models provide a solution on how to distinguish the types of applicants without harming the take-up rate. Using 2013 U.S. state level data, the model predicts that adjusting the cutoff level of the ordeals may change the take-up rates anywhere between 0.008 and 9.233 percent. This range represents the total number of marginal individuals who are in the programs. This sheds some light on what particular cutoff level of ordeals a government should impose so that it does not harm the targeted take-up rates. Advisors/Committee Members: Dr. Yongsheng Xu, Dr. Vivi Alatas, Dr. Carlianne Patrick, Dr. Sally Wallace.

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APA (6^th Edition):

Tasik, H. (2015). Essays on Information Asymmetry and Welfare Benefit. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/110

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Tasik, Hizkia. “Essays on Information Asymmetry and Welfare Benefit.” 2015. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia State University. Accessed February 19, 2019. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/110.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Tasik, Hizkia. “Essays on Information Asymmetry and Welfare Benefit.” 2015. Web. 19 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Tasik H. Essays on Information Asymmetry and Welfare Benefit. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2015. [cited 2019 Feb 19]. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/110.

Council of Science Editors:

Tasik H. Essays on Information Asymmetry and Welfare Benefit. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2015. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/110

5. Liu, Yongzheng. Three Essays on Fiscal Competition and Public Policy.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2013, Georgia State University

URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/94

► This dissertation consists of three essays examining issues related to fiscal competition. The first essay investigates the Stackelberg equilibrium for public input competition and… (more)

▼ This dissertation consists of three essays examining issues related to fiscal competition. The first essay investigates the Stackelberg equilibrium for public input competition and compares it with the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Given two asymmetric regions, I show that under the Nash equilibrium, the more productive region tends to spend more on public input, which results in this region attracting more capital than the less productive region. The comparison of the two equilibria reveals that the leader region obtains a first mover advantage under the Stackelberg setting. This suggests that if regions interact with each other sequentially as in the Stackelberg equilibrium, then the regional disparity that is due to the heterogeneity of productivity is likely to be mitigated or enlarged, depending on which region performs the leadership role in the competition process. This second essay examines how a fiscal equalization system affects the disciplining effect of competition for capital among heterogeneous regions in a decentralized economy. I build a model in which regions that are heterogeneous in initial endowments try to attract capital by competing public input that enhances the productivity of capital; meanwhile, a fiscal equalization system is imposed by the central government to reduce regional disparities in fiscal capacity. The key prediction, borne out in data from the German equalization system, is that while competition for capital strengthens discipline in the well-endowed regions, it weakens discipline in the poorly endowed regions. However, a conventional equalization transfer scheme, common to many countries, can be effective in correcting the distortion driven by the heterogeneity of initial endowments across competing regions. This third essay aims to provide empirical evidence on the extent and possible channels of tax competition among provincial governments in China. Using a panel of provincial level data for 1993-2007, I find strong evidence of strategic tax interaction among provincial governments. Tax policy is approximated by average effective tax rates on foreign investment, taking into account the tax incentives available to foreign investors. In line with the predictions of the theoretical tax competition literature, I also highlight the impact of each province's characteristics (including its size and level of industrialization) on the strategic interaction with its neighbors. Finally, I explicitly identify the establishment of development zones as an important conduit for tax competition among provinces. Advisors/Committee Members: Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez, Dr. James R. Alm, Dr. Sally Wallace, Dr. Yongsheng Xu.

Subjects/Keywords: Fiscal Competition; Public Policy

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APA (6^th Edition):

Liu, Y. (2013). Three Essays on Fiscal Competition and Public Policy. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/94

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Liu, Yongzheng. “Three Essays on Fiscal Competition and Public Policy.” 2013. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia State University. Accessed February 19, 2019. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/94.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Liu, Yongzheng. “Three Essays on Fiscal Competition and Public Policy.” 2013. Web. 19 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Liu Y. Three Essays on Fiscal Competition and Public Policy. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2013. [cited 2019 Feb 19]. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/94.

Council of Science Editors:

Liu Y. Three Essays on Fiscal Competition and Public Policy. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2013. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/94

Georgia State University

6. Chen, Shiyuan. Three Essays in Public Finance.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2008, Georgia State University

URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/53

► This dissertation comprises three essays in public finance. The first essay is a research of a theory of trading of club goods and its application… (more)

▼ This dissertation comprises three essays in public finance. The first essay is a research of a theory of trading of club goods and its application to jurisdiction. The essay establishes a model of trading of club goods among clubs, and illustrates its effects on the process and outcome of club formation. Cost function as well as disutility of crowdedness is emphasized and integrated into the process of club formation, after allowing for exchanging club good among clubs. In the process, the essay develops a market for club goods. Then the model is revised and applied to the formation of jurisdictions. The second essay comes out of an interest regarding household demand, poverty and public goods in developing countries. The essay explores household food consumption in Jamaica and estimates the effects of related variables. With Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 2001 data, the essay estimates an Engel curve which reflects the relation between household food consumption and related variables. What’s more, to investigate the possible neighborhood effect on food consumption, the essay tests and estimates the spatial correlation among neighborhood food consumption. The estimated results can be applied to poverty reduction policy. The third essay extends the theme of poverty, consumption, and government programs by analyzing one other public program—education. Education is closely linked to poverty alleviation. Determining the demand for education and the return to education will help government focus programs aimed at reducing drop-out rates and in the long run, poverty in the country. The essay applies discrete time survival analysis techniques to analyze education duration in Jamaica. Based on Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions 2002, the essay estimates the effects of household, individual and other related covariates on dropout risks of students. The essay compares discrete time Cox model and discrete time logit model and concludes that the two estimations are consistent. The estimation results could be used to predict the effects of changes in the covariates, or be used to predict the dropout risks of particular students in each grade, both of which could provide useful policy implications to improve education in Jamaica. Advisors/Committee Members: Dr. Sally Wallace - Chair, Dr. Yongsheng Xu, Dr. David L. Sjoquist, Dr. Dillon Alleyne.

Subjects/Keywords: Logit; discrete time; Engel; dropout; poverty; intergovernmental cooperation; public policy; public choice; club formation; market; contract; cost; trade; outsourcing; Economics

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APA (6^th Edition):

Chen, S. (2008). Three Essays in Public Finance. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/53

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Chen, Shiyuan. “Three Essays in Public Finance.” 2008. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia State University. Accessed February 19, 2019. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/53.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Chen, Shiyuan. “Three Essays in Public Finance.” 2008. Web. 19 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Chen S. Three Essays in Public Finance. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2008. [cited 2019 Feb 19]. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/53.

Council of Science Editors:

Chen S. Three Essays in Public Finance. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2008. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/53

Georgia State University

7. Wu, Hanji. Finite Bargaining Problems.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2007, Georgia State University

URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/32

► Bargaining is a process to decide how to divide shared resources between two or more players. And axiomatic bargaining specifies desirable and simple properties the… (more)

▼ Bargaining is a process to decide how to divide shared resources between two or more players. And axiomatic bargaining specifies desirable and simple properties the outcome of the bargaining should satisfy and identifies the solution that produces this outcome. This approach was first developed by John Nash in his seminal work(Nash 1950). Since then, numerous studies have been done on bargaining problems with convex feasible set or with non-convex but comprehensive feasible set. There is, however, little work on finite bargaining problems. In this dissertation, we study finite bargaining problems systematically by extending the standard bargaining model to the one consisting of all finite bargaining problems. For our bargaining problems, we first propose the Nash, Maximin, Leximin, Maxiproportionalmin, Lexiproportianlmin solutions, which are the counterparts of those that have been studied extensively in both convex and non-convex but comprehensive problems. We then axiomatically characterize these solutions in our context. We next introduce two new solutions, the maximin-utilitarian solution and the utilitarian-maximin solution, each of which combines the maximin solution and utilitarian solution in different ways. The maximin-utilitarian solution selects the alternatives from the maximin solution that have the greatest sum of individuals’ utilities, and the utilitarian-maximin solution selects the maximin alternatives from the utilitarian solution. These two solutions attempt to combine two important but very different ethical principles to produce compromised solutions to bargaining problems. Finally, we discuss several variants of the egalitarian solution. The egalitarian solution in finite bargaining problems is more complicated than its counterpart in either convex or non-convex but comprehensive bargaining problems. Given its complexity in our context, we start our inquiry by investigating two-person, finite bargaining problems, and then extend some of the analysis to n-person, finite bargaining problems. Our analysis of finite bargaining problems and axiomatic characterizations of the extensions of various standard solutions of convex/non-convex but comprehensive bargaining problems to finite bargaining problems will shed new light on the behavior of these solutions. Our new solutions will expand our understanding of the bargaining theory and distributive justice from a different perspective. Advisors/Committee Members: Dr. Yongsheng Xu - Chair, Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez, Dr. Prasanta Pattanaik, Dr. Ragan Petrie.

Subjects/Keywords: axiomatic approach; solution; finite bargaining problems; Economics

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APA (6^th Edition):

Wu, H. (2007). Finite Bargaining Problems. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/32

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Wu, Hanji. “Finite Bargaining Problems.” 2007. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia State University. Accessed February 19, 2019. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/32.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Wu, Hanji. “Finite Bargaining Problems.” 2007. Web. 19 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Wu H. Finite Bargaining Problems. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2007. [cited 2019 Feb 19]. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/32.

Council of Science Editors:

Wu H. Finite Bargaining Problems. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2007. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/32

Georgia State University

8. Yao, Ming-Hung. Fiscal Decentralization and Public Sector Employment: A Cross-Country Analysis.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2007, Georgia State University

URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/39

► This dissertation seeks to investigate the relationship between public sector employment and fiscal decentralization. We develop a theoretical model that helps us understand the interaction… (more)

▼ This dissertation seeks to investigate the relationship between public sector employment and fiscal decentralization. We develop a theoretical model that helps us understand the interaction of the central executive's and subnational governor's decisions on the level of public employees at the central and subnational levels. Our empirical work shows that fiscal decentralization policy shifts central government employees to the subnational government level and that the increase in public employees at the subnational government level overwhelms the decrease in public employees at the central level. As a result, the level of total public sector employees increases with the degree of fiscal decentralization of a country. We also find that the levels of total public sector employees as a percentage of population are higher in unitary country systems than those in federal countries. The level of public employment also increases with the degree of urbanization and with the exposure to risk of a country. This is a somewhat surprising result. Typically, more public employment is associated with an excessive number of public sector employees, and, therefore, with unproductive spending. On the other hand, fiscal decentralization policy has been generally thought to result in an increase in allocative efficiency, since a decision on public expenditures made by a level of government that is closer and more responsive to a local constituency is more likely to reflect the demand for local services than a decision made by a remote central government. In addition, decentralization has been thought of as having the potential of improving competition among governments and of facilitating technical innovations. Therefore, one might expect that fiscal decentralization should help to retrench the public sector employment. However, from our empirical result, we find that subnational governors without taking full responsibility for subnational public finance tend to bloat the levels of subnational government employees and ask the central government to pay the bill. As a result, the level of total public sector employees increases with fiscal decentralization policy. These findings are much in line with Oates' and Wallis' anticipated results, but they are based on different explanations. Employing the two most commonly used spatial dependency tests, Moran's I and Getis and Ord's G statistics, we also find evidence of spatial dependency in terms of the level of public sector employees as a percentage of population among the countries in our dataset. This finding suggests that while using a country's own domestic variables to explain the level of public sector employment, we should not ignore that the neighboring countries' policies also play an important role in determining it. Advisors/Committee Members: Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez - Chair, Dr. Neven T. Valev, Dr. Sally Wallace, Dr. Yongsheng Xu, Dr. Michael B. Binford.

Subjects/Keywords: public sector employment; fiscal decentralization; Economics

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APA (6^th Edition):

Yao, M. (2007). Fiscal Decentralization and Public Sector Employment: A Cross-Country Analysis. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/39

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Yao, Ming-Hung. “Fiscal Decentralization and Public Sector Employment: A Cross-Country Analysis.” 2007. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia State University. Accessed February 19, 2019. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/39.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Yao, Ming-Hung. “Fiscal Decentralization and Public Sector Employment: A Cross-Country Analysis.” 2007. Web. 19 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Yao M. Fiscal Decentralization and Public Sector Employment: A Cross-Country Analysis. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2007. [cited 2019 Feb 19]. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/39.

Council of Science Editors:

Yao M. Fiscal Decentralization and Public Sector Employment: A Cross-Country Analysis. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2007. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/39

Georgia State University

9. Zheng, Xinye. The Economics of Child Labor.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2006, Georgia State University

URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/16

► In this dissertation, we first develop a simple two-period model to examine the parent's optimal choice of children's time. We identify factors such as wage… (more)

▼ In this dissertation, we first develop a simple two-period model to examine the parent's optimal choice of children's time. We identify factors such as wage rate, school fees, education returns, degree of children's altruism toward their parents and the parents' discounting rate that influence the parents' optimal choice, and discuss their impacts on the optimal choice. Children's time is an important resource for rural households in developing economies, and it is typically allocated by the parents. Two basic uses for this resource are: working in the labor market and attending schools. Schooling today may make children more productive in the future. The opportunity cost of schooling is the forgone wage rate in the labor market. Allocation of children's time is therefore mainly determined by education return, wage rate in labor market and school fees. Many existing models in the literature cannot explain the coexistence of schooling, poverty and the coexistence of child labor and affluence. We extend our basic model to explain the above two paradoxes. We show that, when education return is high and the household is willing to endure extra hardship caused by the child attending school, the coexistence of schooling and poverty can emerge. On the other hand, when the wage rate for child labor and schooling fees are higher than education return, affluence and child labor can co-exist. Governments have adopted various policy tools to fight against child labor, among which the compulsory education law and free education programs stand out. Our basic model is then extended to examine how these two types of government policies may impact child labor. We show the relative performance of the two policies depend crucially on several factors, including the enforcement and the costs to the household of the compulsory education law. We use the recent Chinese experience in changing the compulsory education law to free education plan to illustrate and verify our theoretical prediction. Advisors/Committee Members: Dr. Yongsheng Xu - Chair, Dr. Heying Jenny Zhan, Dr. Felix K. Rioja, Dr. Ragan Petrie, Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez.

Subjects/Keywords: child labor; education returns; wage rates; discounting factors; child's altruistic preference; Economics

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APA (6^th Edition):

Zheng, X. (2006). The Economics of Child Labor. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/16

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Zheng, Xinye. “The Economics of Child Labor.” 2006. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia State University. Accessed February 19, 2019. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/16.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Zheng, Xinye. “The Economics of Child Labor.” 2006. Web. 19 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Zheng X. The Economics of Child Labor. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2006. [cited 2019 Feb 19]. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/16.

Council of Science Editors:

Zheng X. The Economics of Child Labor. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2006. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/16

Georgia State University

10. Ponce Rodriguez, Raul A. Essays on the Political Economy of Taxation.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2007, Georgia State University

URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/24

► In this dissertation we analyze the role of parties’ electoral competition in aggregating voters’ preferences over policy and its impact on tax design. The representation… (more)

▼ In this dissertation we analyze the role of parties’ electoral competition in aggregating voters’ preferences over policy and its impact on tax design. The representation of voters’ interests is central for the analysis of public finance since the issue of aggregation is closely linked to the tradeoff between efficiency and redistribution, and the size and composition of public spending. Parties’ aggregation of preferences is related to the mechanism in which policy makers (parties) weigh the relative merits of competing goals of the tax system (in our analysis, redistribution versus efficiency), and reveals the welfare calculus throughout parties identify groups of individuals who might be beneficiated (hurt) by policy changes. In the first essay we analyze the influence of voters in modifying tax policy through tax initiatives. In this essay we argue that the process of aggregation of preferences between the competition for votes in a representative democracy and the majority rule are different. This, in turn, might lead to the approval of a tax rate limit (TRL) initiative. We argue that the rationale for a TRL proposal is to substitute feasible tax structures rather than to constrain the government’s power to collect taxes. In addition, we provide a model that predicts the tax structure that would arise as a result of a TRL The second essay addresses the role of voters’ partisan attitudes in the determination of fiscal policies. We argue that partisan attitudes and its distribution across the electorate influence the proportion of the expected votes that different coalitions deliver in the election. We identify conditions in which voters’ partisan attitudes affect the provision of a public good and the redistributive properties of the tax structure. The third essay extends our previous analysis of the impact of voters’ partisan attitudes on tax design by incorporating parties that are policy motivated. In this setting, the relative merits of efficiency versus redistribution in designing the tax system are determined by the process of aggregation of voters’ preferences and parties’ preferences over policy. The conflict between parties and the electorate’s preferences over tax policy depends on voters’ partisan attitudes. In particular, voters’ party affiliation soft parties’ electoral constraints, allowing parties to advance the interests of their constituents. The model predicts that redistribution (efficiency) will play a more prominent role for a party that represents a coalition of low (high) income individuals with a high (low) taste for public goods. Advisors/Committee Members: Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez - Chair, Dr. Charles R. Hankla, Dr. Mark W. Rider, Dr. Yongsheng Xu, Dr. James R. Alm.

Subjects/Keywords: tax and expenditure limitations; taxation; redistribution; efficiency; electoral competition; Economics

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APA (6^th Edition):

Ponce Rodriguez, R. A. (2007). Essays on the Political Economy of Taxation. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/24

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Ponce Rodriguez, Raul A. “Essays on the Political Economy of Taxation.” 2007. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia State University. Accessed February 19, 2019. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/24.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Ponce Rodriguez, Raul A. “Essays on the Political Economy of Taxation.” 2007. Web. 19 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Ponce Rodriguez RA. Essays on the Political Economy of Taxation. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2007. [cited 2019 Feb 19]. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/24.

Council of Science Editors:

Ponce Rodriguez RA. Essays on the Political Economy of Taxation. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2007. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/24

Georgia State University

11. Muwonge, Abdu. Local Government Financing and Provision in an Institutionally Constrained Decentralized System: The Case of Agricultural Extension in Uganda.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2007, Georgia State University

URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/37

► Decentralization is a key governance reform which many developing countries have embarked on. Local governments are expected to use their informational advantage to improve the… (more)

▼ Decentralization is a key governance reform which many developing countries have embarked on. Local governments are expected to use their informational advantage to improve the delivery of public goods. This result implied by Tiebout’s (1956) model requires fully informed citizens who “vote with their feet.” The model’s application to developing countries has been limited, since local decisions may not be responsive to local demands. Practitioners are shifting to innovations that minimize institutional constraints so that decentralized programs can lead to improved outcomes. Examples of such innovative ways include decentralized agricultural extension programs, which embrace farmers’ empowerment, local government, and private sector participation. Few impact evaluation studies on agricultural extension have combined qualitative and quantitative methods. This dissertation contributes to the literature by applying these methods and survey data to study the impact of a decentralized extension program in Uganda, known as the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) on the value of farm production per acre. The program is non-randomly assigned to local governments and farmers self-select in or out within participating sub-counties. Using a sample of 305 participating and non-participating farmers and local government assessment indicators as instruments, we cannot reject the null that the NAADS program has had an impact. The 2SLS results show no program impact; however, the OLS results show that the program had a positive impact on the value of farm production per acre of about 20 percent. Qualitative results show that NAADS farmers: participate in local decision making processes through farmers’ institutions; have increased knowledge on farming; and practice enterprise diversification. The quantitative finding must be treated with caution; for example, the study did not account for spillover effects. The NAADS program faces challenges inherent in Uganda’s decentralized structure; particularly the low financial and human capacity, and the weak monitoring at the local level. The policy implications include: the need to strengthen farmers’ institutions; development of a marketing strategy; clear policy guidelines for local government support to NAADS; improved coordination of NAADS activities among line ministries; need for additional resources for NAADS activities; and improved capacity of service providers. Advisors/Committee Members: Dr. Sally Wallace - Chair, Dr. James R. Alm, Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez, Dr. Ragan Petrie, Dr. Yongsheng Xu, Dr. Stephen D. Younger.

Subjects/Keywords: decentralization; agricultural extension; impact evaluation; Economics

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APA (6^th Edition):

Muwonge, A. (2007). Local Government Financing and Provision in an Institutionally Constrained Decentralized System: The Case of Agricultural Extension in Uganda. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/37

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Muwonge, Abdu. “Local Government Financing and Provision in an Institutionally Constrained Decentralized System: The Case of Agricultural Extension in Uganda.” 2007. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia State University. Accessed February 19, 2019. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/37.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Muwonge, Abdu. “Local Government Financing and Provision in an Institutionally Constrained Decentralized System: The Case of Agricultural Extension in Uganda.” 2007. Web. 19 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Muwonge A. Local Government Financing and Provision in an Institutionally Constrained Decentralized System: The Case of Agricultural Extension in Uganda. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2007. [cited 2019 Feb 19]. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/37.

Council of Science Editors:

Muwonge A. Local Government Financing and Provision in an Institutionally Constrained Decentralized System: The Case of Agricultural Extension in Uganda. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2007. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/37

Georgia State University

12. Yunus, Mohammad. Essays on Optimal Mix of Taxes, Spatiality and Persistence under Tax Evasion.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2006, Georgia State University

URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/15

► This dissertation analyzes the optimal mix of direct and indirect taxes in an economy with multiple tax collecting authorities when both the taxes are subject… (more)

▼ This dissertation analyzes the optimal mix of direct and indirect taxes in an economy with multiple tax collecting authorities when both the taxes are subject to evasion and to what extent the tax compliance behavior of individuals in the United States are persistent and spatially dependent. Essay I derives and provides an intuitive interpretation of: (i) impact of the changes in the government instruments on tax evasion by firms, the expected prices they charge, and the expected tax rates they face; (ii) a generalized version of Ramsey rule for optimal commodity taxation which accounts for income tax evasion from either or both the tax authorities; (iii) generalized formulae for the optimal income tax rate for each of the tax authorities; and (iv) the tradeoff between optimal tax rates and audit probabilities for each of the tax authorities. It also re-examines controversies surrounding the uniform income taxes and the differentiated commodity taxes, and investigates how income tax evasion affects the progressivity of the income tax rates. It concludes that whether or not tax evasion calls for reductions in the optimal income tax rates hinges on how tax evasion and the associated concealment costs vary across individual taxpayers. Essay II introduces the twin issues of spatiality and persistence in the individual income tax evasion. While the issue of persistence arises through accumulated learning over time, spatiality arises for several reasons. Some these include the exchange of information between taxpayers; the social norm of tax compliance: an individual would comply if everybody in the society complies and vice versa; individuals faced with dynamic stochastic decision problems that pose immense computational challenges may simply look to others to infer satisfactory policies and interpersonal dependence works through learning by imitating rather than learning by doing. State-level annual per return evasion of individual income tax and related data were used to examine the above hypotheses and found supports for both of them in the individual income tax evasion in the United States. Advisors/Committee Members: Dr. James R. Alm - Chair, Dr. Yongsheng Xu, Dr. Robert J. Eger, III, Dr. Shiferaw Gurmu, Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez, Dr. Mary Beth Walker.

Subjects/Keywords: dynamic effects; optimal taxation; spatial effects; tax evasion; Economics

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APA (6^th Edition):

Yunus, M. (2006). Essays on Optimal Mix of Taxes, Spatiality and Persistence under Tax Evasion. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/15

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Yunus, Mohammad. “Essays on Optimal Mix of Taxes, Spatiality and Persistence under Tax Evasion.” 2006. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia State University. Accessed February 19, 2019. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/15.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Yunus, Mohammad. “Essays on Optimal Mix of Taxes, Spatiality and Persistence under Tax Evasion.” 2006. Web. 19 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Yunus M. Essays on Optimal Mix of Taxes, Spatiality and Persistence under Tax Evasion. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2006. [cited 2019 Feb 19]. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/15.

Council of Science Editors:

Yunus M. Essays on Optimal Mix of Taxes, Spatiality and Persistence under Tax Evasion. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2006. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/15

Georgia State University

13. Zhang, Li. Two Essays on Government Behavior.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2006, Georgia State University

URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/9

► The main theme of this dissertation is government’s strategic behaviors. We show that different budget structures give governments incentives to behave differently, and that the… (more)

▼ The main theme of this dissertation is government’s strategic behaviors. We show that different budget structures give governments incentives to behave differently, and that the Leviathan model and the Bureaucratic model are better in modeling government behaviors than the median voter model. We first discuss theoretically the design of an optimal tax system, promoting the Leviathan government to maximize social welfare in order to maximize its own revenue. Then we examine empirically how government behaviors vary with different budget structures. In essay I, we apply the Buchanan-Brennan (B-B) rule to examine the effects of a tax system on the efficiency of agricultural production in the context of Chinese local governments, which receive insufficient control from the central and are free from the pressure from local residents due to asymmetric information and lack of horizontal accountability. We extend the B-B rule to include the incentive issues and the risk sharing, and also their trade-off. Farmers and the agricultural sector assume significant roles in the national economy of China, while the under-provision of public infrastructures and the risks involved negatively affect agricultural production and therefore impede economic growth. Within the principal-agent framework, we illustrate how the problem is inherent in the agriculture tax system in China and propose our solution of special earmarking. In essay II, we test empirically for the government’s strategic behaviors. We argue that the environmental performance is affected by government policy. Therefore it relates inherently to the budget structure and government incentives. With an illustrating model between structure of revenue and expenditure and pollution level, we propose three hypotheses, which state that the lower the ratio of business related tax in total revenue, the higher the ratio of property tax in total revenue, the higher the share of health expenditure in total expenditure, the government will have higher incentive to control pollution and thus the pollution level is lower. Our empirical evidence provides support to our hypotheses, which show that structures of revenue and expenditure do affect the government’s incentives to control pollution. Therefore, changes in the budget structure might be helpful to achieve better environmental performance. Advisors/Committee Members: Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez - Chair, Dr. Yongsheng Xu, Dr. Mary Beth Walker, Dr. Michael B. Binford, Dr. Roy W. Bahl.

Subjects/Keywords: government; incentive; China; Economics

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APA (6^th Edition):

Zhang, L. (2006). Two Essays on Government Behavior. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/9

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Zhang, Li. “Two Essays on Government Behavior.” 2006. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia State University. Accessed February 19, 2019. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/9.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Zhang, Li. “Two Essays on Government Behavior.” 2006. Web. 19 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Zhang L. Two Essays on Government Behavior. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2006. [cited 2019 Feb 19]. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/9.

Council of Science Editors:

Zhang L. Two Essays on Government Behavior. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2006. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/9

Georgia State University

14. Viceisza, Angelino Casio. Essays on Corruption and Preferences.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2008, Georgia State University

URL: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/49

► This dissertation comprises three essays. The theme that unifies them is "experiments on corruption and preferences." The first essay (chapter 2) reports theory-testing experiments on… (more)

▼ This dissertation comprises three essays. The theme that unifies them is "experiments on corruption and preferences." The first essay (chapter 2) reports theory-testing experiments on the effect of yardstick competition (a form of government competition) on corruption. The second essay (chapter 3) reports theory-testing experiments on the effect of efficiency and transparency on corruption. Furthermore, this essay revisits the yardstick competition question by implementing an alternative experimental design and protocol. Finally, the third essay (chapter 4) reports a theory-testing randomized field experiment that identifies the causes and consequences of corruption. The first essay finds the following. Theoretically, the paper derives a main proposition which suggests that institutions with more noise give rise to an increase in corrupt behavior and a decrease in voter welfare. Empirically, the paper finds a few key results. First, there are an initial nontrivial proportion of good incumbents in the population. This proportion goes down as the experiment session progresses. Secondly, a large proportion of bad incumbents make theoretically inconsistent choices given the assumptions of the model. Third, overall evidence of yardstick competition is mild. Yardstick competition has little effect as a corruption-taming mechanism when the proportion of good incumbents is low. Namely, an institution that is characterized by a small number of good incumbents has little room for yardstick competition, since bad incumbents are likely to be replaced by equally bad incumbents. Thus, incumbents have less of an incentive to build a reputation. This is also the case in which (1) yardstick competition leads to non-increasing voter welfare and (2) voters are more likely to re-elect bad domestic incumbents. Finally, a partitioning of the data by gender suggests that males and females exhibit different degrees of learning depending on the payoffs they face. Furthermore, male voter behavior exhibits mild evidence of yardstick competition when voters face the pooling equilibrium payoff. The second essay finds the following. First, efficiency is an important determinant of corruption. A decrease in efficiency makes it more costly for incumbents to "do the right thing." This drives them to divert maximum rents. While voters retaliate slightly, voters tend to be worse off. Secondly, increased lack of a particular form of transparency (as defined in terms of an increase in risk in the distribution of the unit cost) leaves corrupt incumbent behavior unchanged. In particular, if the draw of the unit cost is unfavorable, incumbents tend to be less corrupt. Third, there is strong evidence of yardstick competition. On the incumbent's side, yardstick competition acts as a corruption-taming mechanism if the incumbent is female. On the voter's side, voters are less likely to re-elect the incumbent in the presence of yardstick competition. Specifically, voters pay attention to the difference between the tax signal in their own jurisdiction and that… Advisors/Committee Members: Dr. James C. Cox - Chair, Dr. Charles N. Noussair, Dr. Mary Beth Walker, Dr. Yongsheng Xu, Dr. Susan K. Laury, Dr. Ragan A. Petrie, Dr. Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez.

Subjects/Keywords: experiments; corruption; incomplete information; signaling games; Economics

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6^th Edition):

Viceisza, A. C. (2008). Essays on Corruption and Preferences. (Doctoral Dissertation). Georgia State University. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/49

Chicago Manual of Style (16^th Edition):

Viceisza, Angelino Casio. “Essays on Corruption and Preferences.” 2008. Doctoral Dissertation, Georgia State University. Accessed February 19, 2019. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/49.

MLA Handbook (7^th Edition):

Viceisza, Angelino Casio. “Essays on Corruption and Preferences.” 2008. Web. 19 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Viceisza AC. Essays on Corruption and Preferences. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2008. [cited 2019 Feb 19]. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/49.

Council of Science Editors:

Viceisza AC. Essays on Corruption and Preferences. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Georgia State University; 2008. Available from: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_diss/49

Open Access Theses and Dissertations