Essays in Experimental Political Economy.
Degree: PhD, Economics, 2011, Brown University
I study experimentally (1) the impacts that a
democratic process has on people?s behaviors and (2) the endogenous
formation of institutions in social dilemmas.The democratic process
of collective decision-making may change individuals? behaviors in
various areas that extend beyond the immediate decision issue. I
use a novel experimental design, in which each individual faces
either two undemocratic implementation processes or one democratic
and one undemocratic implementation process of a mild sanction
policy before they simultaneously play two social dilemma games.
Subjects that participated in democratic decision-making in one
group not only contributed significantly more in that group but
also contributed significantly more in other undemocratic groups,
relative to subjects who did not participate in any democratic
decision-making.My study of endogenous formation of formal
institutions was carried out jointly with Professors Louis
Putterman and Jean-Robert Tyran.We, first, study the formal
sanction schemes in social dilemmas. The burgeoning literature on
the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely
neglected the use of formal sanctions. We let subjects playing a
linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal
sanction scheme capable of either resolving or exacerbating the
free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups
quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient
outcomes.Second, we study the choices between the formal scheme and
the informal scheme in social dilemmas. The sanctioning of
norm-violating behavior by an effective formal authority is
theoretically an efficient solution for social dilemmas. It is in
the self-interest of voters, and is often favorably contrasted with
letting citizens take punishment into their own hands. Allowing
informal sanctions, by contrast, not only comes with a danger that
punishments will be misapplied, but also should have no efficiency
benefit under standard assumptions of self-interested agents. We
experimentally investigate the relative effectiveness of formal
versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public
goods. Unsurprisingly, we find that effective formal sanctions are
popular and efficient when they are free to impose. Surprisingly,
however, we find that informal sanctions are often more popular and
more efficient when effective formal sanctions entail a modest
Advisors/Committee Members: Pedro, Dal B? (Director), Louis, Putterman (Director), Brian, Knight (Reader).
to Zotero / EndNote / Reference
APA (6th Edition):
Kamei, K. (2011). Essays in Experimental Political Economy. (Doctoral Dissertation). Brown University. Retrieved from https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:11441/
Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):
Kamei, Kenju. “Essays in Experimental Political Economy.” 2011. Doctoral Dissertation, Brown University. Accessed February 18, 2019.
MLA Handbook (7th Edition):
Kamei, Kenju. “Essays in Experimental Political Economy.” 2011. Web. 18 Feb 2019.
Kamei K. Essays in Experimental Political Economy. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Brown University; 2011. [cited 2019 Feb 18].
Available from: https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:11441/.
Council of Science Editors:
Kamei K. Essays in Experimental Political Economy. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Brown University; 2011. Available from: https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:11441/