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You searched for +publisher:"Brown University" +contributor:("Eliaz, Kfir"). Showing records 1 – 2 of 2 total matches.

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1. Campbell, James D. Communication Networks in Games with Asymmetric Information.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2010, Brown University

This dissertation asks how structured, local communication among consumers affects markets where those consumers interact with firms who would like to sell to them, when the two groups have asymmetric information. I model local communication by constructing a network that links consumers who talk to each other, and examine how canonical economic settings with asymmetric information change when we incorporate a communication network. Chapter 1 analyzes a signaling game. A firm that can both set price and target sales seeks to sell a product of hidden, exogenous quality to consumers who share information locally with their neighbors in their social network. I find that the firm always restricts and locates early sales in an introductory period such that information on the product's quality spreads throughout the network before the remaining consumers are offered the product. This stands in contrast to signaling games without targeting and local communication, in which signaling high quality requires a costly "money-burning" action. Chapter 2 analyzes a marketing game. Two firms with similar products each choose a set of consumers to inform about their product, and tomorrow that information will spread to those consumers' neighbors. If the firms are not price competitors, they choose symmetric strategies in equilibrium: both inform all consumers if costs are sufficiently low, and both inform the same word-of-mouth maximizing set of consumers if costs are high. If the firms do compete in price, they engage in a particular pattern of market segmentation, informing disjoint but exhaustive sets of consumers. Chapter 3 considers community enforcement. A firm has short-term incentive to cheat its customers, but information on a customer's transaction spreads locally across a social network. When the firm knows the network structure, fully honest trade becomes more difficult to sustain. A vulnerability in one area of the network can spread, and consumers in segments of the network that form tree structures are particularly vulnerable to being cheated. While more communication generally results in more effective community enforcement, institutions that foster rich communication and leave no consumer isolated are also crucial. Advisors/Committee Members: Eliaz, Kfir (Director), Serrano, Roberto (Reader), Bloch, Francis (Reader).

Subjects/Keywords: Networks

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Campbell, J. D. (2010). Communication Networks in Games with Asymmetric Information. (Doctoral Dissertation). Brown University. Retrieved from https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:11152/

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Campbell, James D. “Communication Networks in Games with Asymmetric Information.” 2010. Doctoral Dissertation, Brown University. Accessed July 21, 2019. https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:11152/.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Campbell, James D. “Communication Networks in Games with Asymmetric Information.” 2010. Web. 21 Jul 2019.

Vancouver:

Campbell JD. Communication Networks in Games with Asymmetric Information. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Brown University; 2010. [cited 2019 Jul 21]. Available from: https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:11152/.

Council of Science Editors:

Campbell JD. Communication Networks in Games with Asymmetric Information. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Brown University; 2010. Available from: https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:11152/

2. Pongou, Roland. The Economics of Fidelity in Network Formation.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2010, Brown University

We study network formation in a fidelity mating economy with two types of agents (e.g., men and women). Each enjoys having relationships with the opposite type. Having multiple partners is viewed as infidelity, which is punished if detected. Infidelity is punished more severely for women than for men. In Chapter 2, we characterize networks that are likely to arise in this economy using the concept of pairwise stability. We examine their welfare properties as well. Further, we study the asymmetric effects of the diffusion of a random and unexpected information shock. We derive conditions under which such a shock concentrates more among women than men in all pairwise stable networks. We extend the model to economies characterized by female-to-male subjugation, and to hierarchical mating economies. The analysis sheds light on the functioning and outcomes of several real-life markets. In particular, it provides a unified framework for understanding the role of female discrimination in infidelity punishment, market segmentation, and social inequality in gender differences in HIV/AIDS prevalence. Chapter 3, joint with Roberto Serrano, extends the fidelity model to a dynamic environment, in which agents revise the status of their relationships over time, forming new partnerships or severing existing ones, sometimes making mistakes in these decisions. Using a discrete-time Markov matching process, we characterize networks that arise in the very long run. Findings have implications for long-run gender differences in HIV/AIDS prevalence, and for union formation patterns in developed and developing societies. Chapter 4 extends the fidelity model to multi-ethnic societies, to study how ethnic heterogeneity determines the formation of sexual networks, and how these networks, in turn, affect the spread of HIV/AIDS. We find that if such societies are free of strong interethnic conflicts, agents choose their partners from different ethnic groups to hide their infidelity. This optimizing behavior implies a mechanism wherein ethnic heterogeneity encourages sexual infidelity across ethnic groups, giving rise to sexual networks whose configurations make it easier for HIV/AIDS to spread widely. We validate the model using micro-level data from sub-Saharan Africa, and thus offer a new explanation for high HIV/AIDS prevalence in this region. Advisors/Committee Members: Serrano, Roberto (Director), Foster, Andrew (Director), Eliaz, Kfir (Reader), Putterman, Louis (Reader).

Subjects/Keywords: Fidelity Mating Economy

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Pongou, R. (2010). The Economics of Fidelity in Network Formation. (Doctoral Dissertation). Brown University. Retrieved from https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:11138/

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Pongou, Roland. “The Economics of Fidelity in Network Formation.” 2010. Doctoral Dissertation, Brown University. Accessed July 21, 2019. https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:11138/.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Pongou, Roland. “The Economics of Fidelity in Network Formation.” 2010. Web. 21 Jul 2019.

Vancouver:

Pongou R. The Economics of Fidelity in Network Formation. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Brown University; 2010. [cited 2019 Jul 21]. Available from: https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:11138/.

Council of Science Editors:

Pongou R. The Economics of Fidelity in Network Formation. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Brown University; 2010. Available from: https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:11138/

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