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You searched for +publisher:"Brown University" +contributor:("Brian, Knight"). Showing records 1 – 2 of 2 total matches.

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1. Kamei, Kenju. Essays in Experimental Political Economy.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2011, Brown University

I study experimentally (1) the impacts that a democratic process has on people?s behaviors and (2) the endogenous formation of institutions in social dilemmas.The democratic process of collective decision-making may change individuals? behaviors in various areas that extend beyond the immediate decision issue. I use a novel experimental design, in which each individual faces either two undemocratic implementation processes or one democratic and one undemocratic implementation process of a mild sanction policy before they simultaneously play two social dilemma games. Subjects that participated in democratic decision-making in one group not only contributed significantly more in that group but also contributed significantly more in other undemocratic groups, relative to subjects who did not participate in any democratic decision-making.My study of endogenous formation of formal institutions was carried out jointly with Professors Louis Putterman and Jean-Robert Tyran.We, first, study the formal sanction schemes in social dilemmas. The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable of either resolving or exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes.Second, we study the choices between the formal scheme and the informal scheme in social dilemmas. The sanctioning of norm-violating behavior by an effective formal authority is theoretically an efficient solution for social dilemmas. It is in the self-interest of voters, and is often favorably contrasted with letting citizens take punishment into their own hands. Allowing informal sanctions, by contrast, not only comes with a danger that punishments will be misapplied, but also should have no efficiency benefit under standard assumptions of self-interested agents. We experimentally investigate the relative effectiveness of formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods. Unsurprisingly, we find that effective formal sanctions are popular and efficient when they are free to impose. Surprisingly, however, we find that informal sanctions are often more popular and more efficient when effective formal sanctions entail a modest cost. Advisors/Committee Members: Pedro, Dal B? (Director), Louis, Putterman (Director), Brian, Knight (Reader).

Subjects/Keywords: experiment

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Kamei, K. (2011). Essays in Experimental Political Economy. (Doctoral Dissertation). Brown University. Retrieved from https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:11441/

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Kamei, Kenju. “Essays in Experimental Political Economy.” 2011. Doctoral Dissertation, Brown University. Accessed February 18, 2019. https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:11441/.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Kamei, Kenju. “Essays in Experimental Political Economy.” 2011. Web. 18 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Kamei K. Essays in Experimental Political Economy. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Brown University; 2011. [cited 2019 Feb 18]. Available from: https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:11441/.

Council of Science Editors:

Kamei K. Essays in Experimental Political Economy. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Brown University; 2011. Available from: https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:11441/

2. Depetris Chauvin, Emilio. GUNS, PARASITES, AND STATES: THREE ESSAYS ON COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY.

Degree: PhD, Economics, 2014, Brown University

This dissertation is composed of three chapters on comparative development and political economy. Chapter I examines empirically the role of historical political centralization on the likelihood of contemporary civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. It constructs an original measure of long-run exposure to statehood. It then exploits variation in this new measure along with geo-referenced conflict data to document a robust negative relationship between long-run exposure to statehood and contemporary conflict. Chapter 1 argues that regions with long histories of statehood are better equipped with mechanisms to preserve order. It presents two pieces of evidence consistent with this hypothesis. First, regions with long historical exposure to statehood are less prone to experience conflict when hit by a negative economic shock. Second, Chapter 1 also provides evidence that long historical statehood experience is linked to people's positive attitudes toward state institutions and traditional leaders. Chapter 2 examines the effect of malaria on economic development in Africa over the very long run. Using data on the prevalence of the mutation that causes sickle cell disease it measures the impact of malaria on mortality in pre-colonial Africa. The presented estimate suggests that in the more afflicted regions, malaria lowered the probability of surviving to adulthood by about ten percentage points. Following both a model-based and statistically-based approach, Chapter 2 does not find evidence that the impact of malaria would have been very significant for pre-colonial development. Chapter 3 provides a valuable input for the analysis of future gun policies in the US. Particularly, Chapter 3 exploits monthly data constructed from futures markets on presidential election outcomes and a novel proxy for firearm purchases, to analyze how the demand for guns responded to the likelihood of Barack Obama being elected in 2008. The existence of a large Obama effect on the demand for guns is documented, being this political effect larger than the effect associated to the worsening economic conditions. Furthermore, Chapter 3 presents empirical evidence consistent with the hypotheses that the unprecedented increase in the demand for guns was partially driven by both a fear of a future Obama gun-control policy and racial prejudice. Advisors/Committee Members: Weil, David (Director), Pedro, Dal Bo (Reader), Stylianos , Michalopulos (Reader), Brian, Knight (Reader).

Subjects/Keywords: Conflict

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APA · Chicago · MLA · Vancouver · CSE | Export to Zotero / EndNote / Reference Manager

APA (6th Edition):

Depetris Chauvin, E. (2014). GUNS, PARASITES, AND STATES: THREE ESSAYS ON COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY. (Doctoral Dissertation). Brown University. Retrieved from https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:386226/

Chicago Manual of Style (16th Edition):

Depetris Chauvin, Emilio. “GUNS, PARASITES, AND STATES: THREE ESSAYS ON COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY.” 2014. Doctoral Dissertation, Brown University. Accessed February 18, 2019. https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:386226/.

MLA Handbook (7th Edition):

Depetris Chauvin, Emilio. “GUNS, PARASITES, AND STATES: THREE ESSAYS ON COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY.” 2014. Web. 18 Feb 2019.

Vancouver:

Depetris Chauvin E. GUNS, PARASITES, AND STATES: THREE ESSAYS ON COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY. [Internet] [Doctoral dissertation]. Brown University; 2014. [cited 2019 Feb 18]. Available from: https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:386226/.

Council of Science Editors:

Depetris Chauvin E. GUNS, PARASITES, AND STATES: THREE ESSAYS ON COMPARATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY. [Doctoral Dissertation]. Brown University; 2014. Available from: https://repository.library.brown.edu/studio/item/bdr:386226/

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