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Author
Title Essays on Asymmetric Contests and Urbanization in India
URL
Publication Date
Degree PhD
Discipline/Department Moore School of Business
Degree Level doctoral
University/Publisher University of South Carolina
Abstract I study asymmetric all-pay auction contests where the prize has the same value for all players, but players might have different cost functions. I allow for the cost functions to be discontinuous as long as they are right-continuous. In that setting, I determine sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of the conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium. Employing this framework, I discuss the implementation of a soft cap on bids and the effect that has on the conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium and players’ bidding behavior, especially with respect to a situation where there is no cap on bids. I also determine the total cost and expected aggregate bids which would influence, and also have an effect on the organizing of such contests. Drawing from the framework mentioned above, I analyze the implementation of a rigid cap on bids. Rigid cap being one which simply cannot be breached. I determine the players’ bidding behavior in the conventional mixed-strategy equilibrium and compute the total cost and expected aggregate bids in this situation. In the fourth chapter, I explore linguistic explanations for the extremely low labor mobility, but paradoxically high urban wage premium in India. I show how linguistic diversity in India hinders internal migration across state borders. I also find evidence, albeit a weak one, to show that an individual who can speak English is more likely to migrate to an urban center. I find much stronger evidence that links educational attainment with migrating to urban centers.
Subjects/Keywords Economics; Social and Behavioral Sciences; asymmetric all-pay auction; mixed-strategy equilibrium; bidding behavior; total cost and expected aggregate bids; rigid bid cap; linguistic diversity in India
Contributors Alexander Matros
Rights Open Access Dissertation
Country of Publication us
Record ID oai:scholarcommons.sc.edu:etd-6502
Repository south-carolina
Date Retrieved
Date Indexed 2020-08-13
Created Date 2019-07-01 07:00:00

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…first papers to formally analyze model a contest with caps. They model a contest as a complete information two-player all-pay auction where players have different valuations for the same prize and their bid is the cost they incur in participating in the…

…bids made by contestants in large all-pay auction contests; where a large number of heterogeneous contestants compete for a large number of prizes. They conclude that as far as aggregate costs are concerned, flexible caps have next to no effect, but…

…asymmetric contest as an all-pay auction where the players have the same valuation of the prize, but different right-continuous cost functions. In doing so, we seek to capture the ‘jump’, or the discontinuity in the costs owing to a non-rigid fine or a soft…

…x28;5) 𝑡2 ≤ 𝑡1 . (6) and based on which, we call Player 1 more efficient player. Each player 𝑖 exerts effort 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0 in order to win the prize in the all-pay auction and obtains the following payoff 𝑢𝑖 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 )…

…player all-pay auction where players have different valuations for the same prize and their bid is the cost they incur in participating in the contest. They consider a rigid cap on bids which simply cannot be breached. As their model considers the cost to…

…paper, Olszewski and Siegel (2019) look at the effect of both, rigid and soft caps on the aggregate costs incurred by, and aggregate bids made by contestants in large all-pay auction contests; where a large number of heterogeneous contestants…

…argue that a soft cap has no effect on aggregate costs. These results are highlighted in Table 1. We model an asymmetric contest as an all-pay auction where the players have the same valuation of the prize, but different right-continuous cost functions…

…Player 1 more efficient player. Each player 𝑖 exerts effort 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0 in order to win the prize in the all-pay auction and obtains the following payoff 𝑢𝑖 (𝑥1 , 𝑥2 ) = −𝐿𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 ) , if 𝑥𝑖 < 𝑥−𝑖 , 𝑉 − 𝐿𝑖 (𝑥𝑖…

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