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Title Assessing the effectiveness of payments for environmental services in improving community-based forest conservation in Chiapas, Mexico
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University/Publisher Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Abstract A range of economic instruments aiming at stopping tropical deforestation has been implemented in developing countries over the past few decades. Among these, Payments for Environmental Services (PES, also called Payments for Ecosystem Services) have been theorized as contract-based mechanisms that provide incentives to better conserve forests in a cost-effective way. However, evidence about their performance is still recent and scarce, notably their environmental effectiveness but also their ability to induce forest managers’ behavioral change and foster collective action between governmental agencies and community institutions for achieving long-term forest conservation. This dissertation aims at evaluating the implementation of PES in collectively-owned forests in the state of Chiapas, Mexico. Specifically, it investigates i) if PES are generating additional forest conservation outcomes during contract implementation; ii) the influence of technical service providers over PES implementation; iii) what are the preferences of community members regarding PES contract characteristics; and iv) the extent to which community members are able to translate PES requirements into socially embedded and collectively enforced forest management institutions. Data collection relies on both qualitative and quantitative methods, adopting a case-study approach that comprises several analytical scales: state, regional and community levels. Overall, the findings of this dissertation contribute to current debates on the environmental performance and social and institutional repercussions of PES. They suggest that PES can significantly reduce deforestation during contract implementation, but complementary policy-mixes are needed to institutionalize forest management rules both into community institutions and between community members, governmental agencies and other stakeholders. Strategies targeting community leaders to adapt PES contracts to social norms and institutional characteristics of communities may appear effective in the short-term but could also lead to degraded collective action if these leaders increase their privilege through their control of PES implementation. Although not all technical service providers have the capacity or the desire to supervise community participation and compliance, these actors are key to internalize PES incentives into the communities’ social norms framing conservation and to coordinate a transformation of local institutions shaping forest management. Policy makers should therefore consider more context-sensitive PES implementation approaches to analyze and resolve failures in collective action and subsequently recraft institutional arrangements governing natural resources management. Interdisciplinary research frameworks could contribute to better understand the critical conditions enabling such institutional change through monetary incentives.
Subjects/Keywords Pagaments per serveis ambientals; Pagos por servicios ambientales; Payments for environmental services; Eficàcia; Eficacia; Effectiveness; Mèxic; México; Mexico; Ciències Experimentals; 504
Contributors Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia Ambientals; [email protected] (authoremail); true (authoremailshow); Corbera, Esteve (director); Ezzine-de-Blas, Driss (director); true (authorsendemail)
Language en
Rights L'accés als continguts d'aquesta tesi queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess [Always confirm rights and permissions with the source record.]
Country of Publication es
Record ID handle:10803/457435
Repository barcelona
Date Indexed 2018-03-22
Issued Date 2017-09-13 00:00:00

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